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Claims settlement and claims avoidance in the current
ship repair and overhaul industry are extremely difficult.
The intense competition and depressed economic status of the
industry has forced several industry contractors to adopt
contract buy-in and the submission of zero profit margin
bids as a business strategy. The lack of commercial repair
and overhaul work leaves the Navy as the dominant industry
customer. Navy contracts accounted for 90 percent of the
entire industry workload in 1986. This research examines
the current claims avoidance techniques employed by the Navy
and their effectiveness for future claims avoidance. It
also recommends management techniques and procedures for the
improving claims avoidance. This research has conducted a
literature search, supplemented by interviews with
Government and industry officials.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The major contracting initiative of the 1980' s is
competition. Its effect as the central theme in Government
acquisition has been a significant factor in reducing
acquisition cost. However in highly competitive industries,
such as ship repair and overhaul, full and open competition
has had mixed results.
The ship repair and overhaul industry of the United
States is almost wholly dependent on the Navy's repair and
overhaul programs for its continued existence. The lack of
repair and overhaul programs to support the industrial base
coupled with the Navy's contracting practice of awarding
firm fixed-price contracts to the lowest responsible bidder,
has created an extremely competitive environment. This cut-
throat competition has resulted in very optimistic and often
unrealistic contractor bids (buy-ins) [Ref. l:pp. 13-14].
Contractor buy-ins usually result in an attempt to recover
cost and make a profit through contract changes and requests
for equitable adjustment. The inability in this situation
to obtain a favorable settlement usually results in a claim
against the Government.
Claims and disputes are both time consuming and costly.
There are usually no real winners despite the nature of the
settlement. In addition to the adverse relationship that
usually develops between the contractor and the Government,
the vessel undergoing repair may be delayed in its return to
the operational fleet. As the size of the fleet approaches
the 600 ship goal and the Navy's Homeporting Initiatives
disperse the fleet along America's coastline, the number of
contractors competing for ship repair and overhaul contracts
will increase. This increased workload will further impact
the Naval Sea Systems Command's efforts to prevent
contractor buy-ins and avoid claims and disputes in the
future
.
A. FOCUS OF RESEARCH
This study will focus on ship repair and overhaul claims
and claims avoidance techniques. It will examine the
current trend in ship repair and overhaul claims. An
analysis of current contracting methods and management
practices will be made to determine their effect on claims
and claims avoidance. Critical industry economic factors
and business practices will be evaluated in an attempt to
determine the motivation for contractor claims. The results
of this study will be the presentation of those contracting
and management techniques and procedures which are most
effective in reducing contractor claims. Further, the
researcher will explore the feasibility of developing new
claims avoidance techniques.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic purpose of this research is to identify the
contracting methods and managerial practices most effective
in claims avoidance without incurring additional cost or
risk to the Government or sacrificing competition. This will
provide Naval Sea Systems Command managerial and contracting
personnel with a model of contracting methods and managerial
practices which will reduce and avoid contractor claims in
ship repair and overhaul procurement.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the contracting and management techniques
and procedures that can be employed to reduce to avoid
contractor claims in the ship repair and overhaul industry
and how might such claims be avoided in the future?
2. Subsidiary Questions




What are the current principal contracting areas in
ship repair and overhaul that contribute to contractor
claims?
3. How have the recent Congressional and DOD initiatives
to reduce cost through full and open competition
affected ship repair and overhaul claims?
4. What effect have socio-economic initiatives had on the
ability of the Contracting Officer to eliminate
irresponsible bid proposals from Section 8(a) Small
Business contractors?
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5. What are the effects of current critical economic
factors on the ship repair and overhaul industry and
what effect have they had on the industry's ability to
perform?
6. What are the effects of the current "NAVSEA Anti-Buy-
In" initiatives as a claims avoidance technique?
7. Can ship repair and overhaul acquisition be modeled to
reduce and avoid claims and disputes?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research data were collected by means of literature
search, and telephone and personal interviews. The
background of this study was developed through the
literature search and interviews. Telephone and personal
interviews were conducted with selected ship repair and
overhaul contractors and key Naval Sea Systems Command
headquarters and field level personnel.
Interviews were held on a non-attributable basis to aid
in obtaining honest and candid answers. Telephone and
personal interviews were extremely important in obtaining
industry's viewpoint on Government contracting methods and
management techniques.
The literature review included several contracting
periodicals. Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Naval
Audit Service reports, Magazine and newspaper articles,
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange studies,
Naval Postgraduate School Masters of Science theses,
significant speeches of Government and contractor personnel,
and DOD and Navy instructions. The literature reviewed
supported the established bases for claims and the opinions
of the majority of personnel interviewed.
Interviews were conducted with Government and contractor
personnel involved in ship repair and overhaul acquisition.
The purposes of these interviews were to obtain expert
opinions of current claims issues and problems, and
suggestions for contracting methods and management
techniques to avoid or reduce future claims. The majority
of interviews were with U.S. Navy personnel engaged in ship
repair acquisition, claims settlements, and claims
avoidance. Large and small business ship repair and
overhaul contractors from all regions of the country were
interviewed to obtain a composite industry perspective.
The interviews were structured around the primary and
subsidiary thesis research questions. The questions were
modified when interviewing contractor personnel. A final
catch-all question was asked to invite comment on any
additional information the interviewee considered pertinent.
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis will discuss, analyze and evaluate the
current trend in ship repair and overhaul claims and claims
avoidance techniques. Additionally, it will evaluate the
impact of "Naval Sea System Commands Anti-Buy-In"
initiatives, the increased utilization of firm fixed-priced
contracts, socio-economic objectives, and competition. The
researcher will explore the contracting techniques and
10
management practices currently used in ship repair and
overhaul procurement, and will recommend possible contract
methods and types and management practices that can be
utilized by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to reduce
and avoid claims and disputes in ship repair and overhaul
procurement
.
This study is limited to the analysis of ship repair and
overhaul claims and claims avoidance techniques. It is
intended to identify the contracting methods and managerial
practices most effective in avoiding future contractor
claims.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with standard
Department of Defense acquisition concepts and terminology.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II
provides a background and framework of the Navy ship repair
and overhaul organization, a definition of contractor claims
and the disputes process, and the basic reasons for claims
in ship repair and overhaul. A review of critical claims
issues and problems is provided in Chapter III.
Chapter IV is an analysis of the current trend in ship
repair and overhaul claims and the effect of claims
avoidance techniques. It also discusses the implications
and consequences of proposed contracting methods and
management practices, and the obstacles to their
11
implementation. Finally, Chapter V provides conclusions,
recommendations, and areas for further research.
12
II. BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
The United States of America is a sea-going nation with
global security commitments. As a democratic society with
a capitalistic economy, we endorse open international trade.
Our overall economic health is dependent on the uninhibited
access to international markets through the shipping lanes
of the high seas. A strong and vigilant Naval Force is
required to ensure free access to the shipping lanes,
defense of our shores, and the ability to project power
ashore to fulfill security agreements and protect the
interests of the United States abroad.
The importance of a strong and vigilant fleet has been
essential to the security of the nation throughout our
history. The current buildup of the fleet resulted from a
1976 National Security Council Review of U.S. Maritime
Strategy and Naval Force requirements for the 1980' s and
1990' s. The review, initiated by President Ford, indicated
that an active fleet of 600 ships was required to carry out
the Navy's role of ensuring wartime control of sea lanes and
protection of peacetime maritime commerce [Ref 2:pp. 31-32].
The shipbuilding and ship repair industry of the United
States has more than adequate capacity and capability to
accomplish the past, present, and planned programs of the
13
Navy. The almost non-existent and declining merchant
shipbuilding and repair by U.S. shipyards has made the
industry almost totally dependent on the Navy for survival
[Ref. 3:p. i] . This excess capacity coupled with Navy and
Department of Defense contracting initiatives to ensure the
acquisition and maintenance of the 600 ship fleet in the
most cost efficient manner has created two major problems:
1) the impact on national security of the erosion of the
shipyard and supplier mobilization industrial base, and 2)
the increase in contractor requests for equitable adjustment
and claims against the Government as a method to compensate
for cost overruns due to unrealistic bids (buy-ins) [Ref.
l:p. 13]. This thesis will focus on the second issue of
contractor claims against the Government on ship repair and
overhaul contracts. The researcher will analyze and
evaluate current claims and claims avoidance techniques in
order to identify contracting methods and managements
practices to reduce or avoid claims and disputes.
The complexity of ship repair contracts, the large
number of people involved in the contracting process, and
the standardized statement of work requirements (i.e., open
and inspect items) guarantee contract changes will be
required. The Master Ship Repair and Alteration Contract
(commonly referred to as the Master Ship Repair (MSR)
contract) is an agreement between the Government and a
contractor certified to perform ship repair work on Navy
14
ships. The MSR contract states the terms and conditions in
effect should the contractor be awarded a job order for
repair work at a later date. Although the job order or
contract is awarded through sealed bidding or competitive
proposals, the contractor is thoroughly familiar with the
provisions of the contract and the resources and operating
procedures of the local Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion, and Repair (SUPSHIP) assigned to administer the
contract. SUPSHIP Contracting Officers and claims avoidance
officials contend this relationship serves the contractor
well in negotiating changes and initiating requests for
equitable adjustment and claims.
B. NAVY SHIP REPAIR AND OVERHAUL ORGANIZATION
Before analyzing the details of ship repair and overhaul
claims and claims avoidance techniques, a brief examination
of the repair organization is important to establish the
framework of the operation. The ultimate responsibility for
the maintenance and repair of the U.S. Naval Fleet belongs
to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . He is responsible
to the Secretary of the Navy for fleet readiness,
utilization, and logistic support both in war and peacetime.
Additionally, he formulates strategic plans to carry out the
missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense. In this
capacity the CNO issues broad logistic requirements to the
system commands (SYSCOMS) and Fleet Commanders for further
implementation and procurement. Specifically, he justifies
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and supports request to Congress for the funds required to
carry out the ship repair and overhaul program.
The CNO approves the annual overhaul schedules for all
fleet ships as recommended by NAVSEA and the Commanders of
the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. He also approves all
overhaul schedules established by the District Commanders
and the Officers-In-Charge of Naval Inactive Ship
Maintenance Facilities for ships under their cognizance.
Finally, he is the ultimate approval authority for
alterations which affect the military characteristics of
ships. CNO has delegated to the Type Commanders (TYCOMS)
authority to assign Restricted Availabilities (RAVs) and
Technical Availabilities (TAVs) for ships under their
cognizance. The SUPSHIP should request extensions of
availability from the authorities granting the original
availability via the chain of command and from the SYSCOMS
for alterations under their cognizance. [Ref. 4: pp. 107-
108]
The Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEA-
SYSCOM) is responsible to the CNO for the:
. . . research, development, logistic planning, test,
technical evaluation, acquisition, procurement,
contracting, production, construction, manufacture,
inspection, fitting out, supply maintenance, alteration,
conversion, repair, overhaul, modification, inventory
management, and advance base outfitting of naval material
for which he is assigned responsibility. [Ref 4:p. 109]
The mission of NAVSEA is to provide material support to
the Navy and Marine Corps for ships and crafts, the
shipboard weapon systems and components thereof, ammunition,
guided missiles, mines, torpedoes and all other surface and
underwater ordnance. COMNAVSEASYSCOM acts as coordinator of
shipbuilding, conversion and repair for the Navy
Establishment and the Departments of Defense and Commerce.
In this capacity NAVSEA provides authority to carry out
the functions of procurement and contract administration for
ship repair and overhaul to the Office of Ship Repair,
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Overhaul and Conversion. This coordinator of this office
directs the actions of local field activities in carrying
out this function. The local Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) is a procurement office for
the placement of the MSR contract, and award of job orders
within the framework of the MSR. SUPSHIP also administers
these contracts and job orders. It performs all of the
contract administration functions listed in the FAR to the
extent applicable to MSR contracts and job orders and to
other contracts assigned at commercial shipyards under its
cognizance [Ref. 4:p. 105].
1. The Master Ship Repair Contract
The purpose of the Master Ship Repair Contract for
repair and alteration of vessels is to establish, in
advance, the terms and conditions under which the contractor
will perform. The use of the MSR contract procedures
expedites awards of job orders for repair work, reduces
administrative efforts and costs, and provides contractors
the opportunity to bid on, and perform repair work under
uniform and consistent terms and conditions. The MSR
contract is not a guarantee of work, an entitlement to
future awards, or a certification of the contractor's
ability to perform every possible repair job. Job orders
are awarded on a competitive basis through sealed bids or
competitive proposals.
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A contractor wishing to obtain an MSR contract must
submit a request for award to the local SUPSHIP. The
SUPSHIP Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) determines
whether to award or deny the MSR contract based on the
results of a pre-award survey of the contractor's
facilities. This survey is conducted by a team of qualified
SUPSHIP professionals with the necessary industrial
experience to make a sound appraisal of the contractor's
management, labor and facilities.
The basic criteria for qualification is listed in
the DAR [Ref. 5:para. 1-902, 1-903], supplemented by
criteria particularly applicable to ship repair yards as
described below [Ref 4:pp. 405-409]:
1. Satisfactory management, engineering, and technical
personnel
2. Satisfactory administrative control over current
operations
3. Adequate facilities
4. Satisfactory financial condition
5. Absence of zoning restrictions
6. Prior experience
7. Adequate facilities for accommodating personnel of the
ship
8. Adequate facilities for providing standard service to
the ship
9. Quality Assurance





The MSR contract cannot be utilized to purchase
material or work that is not a part of the Ship Alteration
and Repair package (SARP) . Other areas where the use of the
MSR contract is prohibited are [Ref. 4:p. 401]:
1. Towing and stevedoring when not included in the job
order for repair of the vessel
2. Procurement of material and cost of packaging, crating
or shipping material when not included in the job
order for repair of the vessel





5. Repairs to material in store
6. Manufacturing when not part of a ship work job order
7. Design work when not part of a ship work job order.
Modification of any of the clauses of the MSR
contract requires the approval of the NAVSEA Deputy
Commander for Contracts [Ref. 4:p. 402]. This restriction
on modification ensures the consistency and uniformity of
MSR contracting procedures. However, the local SUPSHIP can
recommend any changes or modifications to NAVSEA which will
improve the administration of job orders. Appendix A lists
the standard MSR contract clauses.
The MSR contract is revised periodically to
incorporate any changes in the statutes and procurement
regulations. Once changes are made, all outstanding MSR
19
contracts are cancelled and replaced by the updated version.
The MSR contract is not transferable. If a repair facility
is sold or ownership changes, the MSR contract is cancelled.
Clause 32 of the MSR contract provides that "either
of the parties shall have the right to cancel the contract
by giving the other party notice thereof". NAVSEA policy
dictates consideration of MSR contract cancellation for any




2. Change of firm's name, management, or owner
3. Default under a job order
4. Inclusion in Joint Consolidated List of Debarred,
Ineligible and Suspended Contractors as outlined in
section I, part 6 of the DAR
5. Removal or sale of facilities
6. Revision of DD DAR Form 731
7. No longer meets the standards for award of the MSR
contract.
2. Planning for Overhaul and Repair
Effective planning is the key element in achieving a
successful overhaul at a reasonable price. Inefficient
planning can result in poorly defined work items, a reliance
on contingencies in the contractor-' s proposal , improper work
accomplishment and interpretation of specifications,
disputes, and unrealistic cost estimates and bids. The
accuracy of job order work items and cost estimates cannot
be over emphasized. The SUPSHIP ACO relies heavily on the
cost estimates in the evaluation of bids or proposals
20
received for the proposed work. Additionally, for the
SUPSHIP inspection personnel to insist on adequate standards
of workmanship by certain contractors, they must be able to
refer to clear and detailed work items.
NAVSEA proposes overhaul schedules which include
three fiscal years [Ref. 6:p. 1] . The proposed schedules
are forwarded to the Fleet and Type Commanders (TYCOMs) for
review and comment. The revised schedules are then
forwarded to the CNO for final review and publication. The
first year's schedule is for execution and the second and
third year schedules are used for planning and budgeting
purposes.
Upon receipt of the schedules, the SUPSHIP begins
the scheduling action. It is essential that the SUPSHIP
planning milestones are accomplished in a timely manner to
permit maximum leadtime for ordering material and the
prefabrication of work by the contractor. At approximately
A-500, (500 days prior to the commencement of the overhaul)
,
A-540 for selected overhauls, the SUPSHIP sends a letter of
information to the ship. One of the most important aspects
of this letter is the confirmation of the overhaul date.
Basically there are three major functions to be
performed in planning for a ship overhaul or repair action:
1. Planning Coordination. Planning coordination involves
the coordination of the SUPSHIP' s external and
internal planning activities. External activities
include: ensuring ship availability, receipt of work
request and alteration authorization, scheduling the
SUPSHIP planning and bidders' inspections, ensuring
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adequate funds are available, coordinating the
activities of the ship and the Type Commander, and
other similar functions. Internal activities include:
the distribution of work requirements, assembly and
review of final work items including cost estimates,
coordinating requests for drawings, technical
information, Government Furnished Material (GFM) , and
design and other services.
2. Job Planning. The major portion of SUPSHIP planning
is carried out by the job planners. They receive,
evaluate, and prepare preliminary estimates for work
request and alteration documents; conduct ship
planning inspections; initiate requests for drawings,
GFM, technical information, and required services; and
prepare job order work items and cost estimates for
assigned work items within their trade cognizance.
3. Support Functions. Support functions include such
activities as the typing and reproduction of job order
work items; design services; the reproduction of
drawings for distribution to prospective contractors;
planning and estimating; and obtaining the GFM
required for the overhaul or repair.
The Planning and Engineering for Repair and
Alterations (PERA) offices located at each naval shipyard
are an extension of NAVSEA's Ship Logistic Division. They
develop the overhaul and repair packages for ships on the
repair schedule. After conducting pre-overhaul tests and
inspections, PERA prepares the ship alteration and repair
package (SARP) and submits it to the SUPSHIP for cost
estimating. The SARP is the basic screening document for
repair. It determines if the work will be accomplished by
the ship's force, an intermediate maintenance activity
(IMA) , or the shipyard.
Upon completion of the test and inspections, work
packages, and cost estimates; an invitation for bids (IFB)
or request for proposals (RFP) is sent out to repair
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activities which have the capability to perform the required
work. Work packages are often split to reduce the scope of
the work and obtain maximum competition. Under this concept,
the drydocking and topside work packages may be split to
create individual lots for bids. After the bidders
conference and bid opening, an award is made. This award is
most often for a firm fixed-priced contract awarded to the
lowest responsive and responsible bidder. The ship is now
ready to undergo repair. Appendix B outlines the milestones
for planning private shipyard overhauls and selected
restricted availabilities.
The milestones or target dates established by NAVSEA
for the completion of the specification package and contract
award for the different types of repair actions are [Ref.
4:pp. 241, 2-B3]:
Submit Screened Award
Scope of Work Work Request Notification
Regular Overhaul A-150 A-60
Selected Overhaul A-180 A-90
Nonemergent RAV's
(mandays)
- Greater Than 8,000 A-140 A-30
- 8,000-4,000 A-140 A-30
- 4,000-800 A-100 A-14
- 800-400 A-40 A-10
- Less Than 400 A-30 A-7
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Occasionally ship repairs of an emergency nature
occur which cannot be delayed to the next scheduled overhaul
or availability. This work may be accomplished as an RAV or
TAV, or as an emergency voyage repair as specified by the
cognizance Type Commander. While some nonscheduled
requirements can be handled in the same manner as scheduled
repairs, others cannot and present a severe planning problem
for the SUPSHIP. Often job planners will not have the
opportunity to conduct planning inspections of the ship. In
this case they will have to prepare the work items solely on
the ship's work request or the description of the work in
messages submitted by the ship.
The planning officer should work closely with the
ACO to determine the appropriate method of procurement.
Although the Contracting Officer has final responsibility
for determining the method of procurement, he must be
advised of the time required to conduct repairs, the
technical nature of the work, and other unique requirements.
C. THE DISPUTES AND CLAIMS PROCESS
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 provides the framework
for submission and resolution of ship repair and overhaul
claims. Prior to its passage, Government contracts
contained disputes clauses which provided a three-tiered
process the parties must follow to resolve a controversy:
1) the decision of the Contracting Officer, 2) an appeal to
the head of the agency, ruled on by that agency's board of
24
contract appeals, and 3) a limited review by a court [Ref.
7: p. 1] . This was accepted by the contractors as an
efficient and inexpensive way of resolving controversies,
despite the appearance of Government control of the process.
[Ref. 7:p. 1]
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 implemented signifi-
cant changes in the method for resolution and disposition of
controversies and disputes. Before discussing the
significant features of the Act and comparing them to the
old disputes procedures, definitions of requests for
equitable adjustment and claims are appropriate.
A "Request for Equitable Adjustment" (REA) is a routine
request by the contractor for monetary payment, extension of
the delivery schedule, or both. The form of the REA is
dependent on the provisions of the contract, such as the
payments or economic price adjustment clauses. An REA is
not a dispute at the time of receipt by the Government.
[Ref. 8:p. 1]
A "Claim" is a written demand or written assertion by
one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of
right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment
or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising
under or relating to the contract. A claim arising under a
contract, unlike a claim relating to that contract, is a
claim that can be resolved under a contract clause that
25
provides for the relief sought by the claimant. [Ref. 9:p.
945]
The Contracts Disputes Act expanded the scope of the
procedures under Government contracts for administrative
resolution of certain controversies connected with the
contract (Figure 2-1 compares the old and new procedures)
.
The Act requires a contracting officer's final decision
(COFD) on all claims by the contractor against the
Government relating to the contract. The particular type of
claims covered by the Act include [Ref. 7:pp. 45-54]:




3. Public Law 85-804 request for relief
4. Claims for non-monetary relief
5. Contract award controversies
6. Tort claims
7. Subcontractor claims.
The significant features of the Act are [Ref. 7:p. 14]:
1. The Act makes the Court of Claims the sole court with
the authority to hear claims under the disputes
procedures.
2. The Act gives the contractor "direct access" to the
Court of Claims in lieu of the agency board of appeals
if they elect a trial in that court.
3. It gives the Court of Claims the power to retain a
case where it finds error by a board and to conduct
such a trial as necessary to dispose of the case.
4. The Act broadens the coverage of the disputes
procedures to include all claims relating to the
contract.
26
































Source: Cibinic and Nash, Government Contract Claims
Figure 2-1 The Disputes Process
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5. The Act provides for Government appeal of a board
decision to the Court of Claims, by the agency head
with the approval of the Attorney General.
6. The act provides for initial appeal to the Contracting
Officer.
7. Establishes the independence of the agencies.
A contractor's initial request for relief, due to a
change in the terms and conditions of the original contract,
usually do not constitute a claim. The request is usually a
request for an equitable adjustment, and does not request or
require a Contracting Officer's final decision. As is often
the case, negotiations between the Government's Contracting
Officer and the contractor are entered into, to attain
agreement on the request submitted by the contractor, if it
is not acceptable in its original form.
The changes clause in all Government contracts requires
the contractor to submit a request for equitable adjustment
within 3 days of receipt of a written change order. In the
case of a constructive change, he is obligated to protest to
the Contracting Officer that, in his opinion, such a change
has occurred, or secure an order in writing before doing the
work. [Ref. 9:pp. 358, 360-361]
The contractors request for equitable adjustment
converts to a claim against the Government when he
subsequently requests the Contracting Officer to issue a
final decision on the matter. In order for the claim to be
valid it must be in writing, and if the payment requested is
in excess of $50,000, the contractor must certify the claim.
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The following certificate (signed by a senior company
official) is used to accomplish the certification [Ref. 7:p.
69]
:
I certify that this claim is made in good faith, that the
supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of
my knowledge and belief; and that the amount requested
accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which (the
contractor) believes the Government is liable.
(Official's Name)
(Title)
An improper certification due to fraud or
misrepresentation of facts may subject the contractor to
civil liability under the False Claims Act. This Act
imposes a modest $2,000 forfeiture, but permits the
Government to recover "double the amount of damages which
the United States may have sustained by reason of doing or
committing such an act" [Ref. 7:p. 126].
Upon receipt of a request for a final decision on a
valid claim, the Contracting Officer has 60 days to issue a
final decision for claims under $50,000. For claims in
excess of $50,000 the Contracting Officer shall issue a
decision in 60 days or notify the contractor of the
"reasonable" time within which a decision will be issued
[Ref. 7:p. 6].
Upon receipt of the Contracting Officer's final
decision, the contractor has the following options [Ref.
9:p. 949]:
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1. Accept the decision
2
.
Re-enter negotiations with the Government to settle
the claim
3 Appeal the decision to the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) within 90 days
4. Appeal the decision to the U. S. Court of Claims
within 12 months.
The ruling of the ASBCA or the Court of Claims can be
appealed by the contractor or the Government (agency head
with the approval of the Attorney General) to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
An accelerated procedure for the resolution of claims
under $50,000 can be exercised at the option of the
contractor. The claim is submitted to the ASBCA and the
decision rendered is not appealable. Appeals under the
accelerated procedure shall be resolved, whenever possible
within 180 days from the date the contractor elects to
utilize the procedure [Ref. 7:p. 198].
D. BASES FOR SHIP REPAIR AND OVERHAUL CLAIMS
The primary bases for ship repair and overhaul
contractor claims are: 1) changes to the contract, 2) late
or defective Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and
Government Furnished Information (GFI) , 3) economic and
contractual causes, 4) complex causes and effects, and 5)
other miscellaneous causes of claims [Ref. 10:pp. 5-14].
Awareness of the situations in which claims are most likely
to arise by both the contractor and the Government, will
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enable them to recognize and avoid potential claims in all
phases of the contractual relationship. It will also better
prepare them to recognize and document significant events
which contribute to the creation of claims. This will
enable both parties to negotiate more equitably and
efficiently in claims settlement procedures.
1. Changes
Changes are a common aspect of ship repair and
overhaul contracts and, in most cases, are essential to
ensure satisfactory repairs are attained. The complexity
and general nature of ship repair contracts make changes
necessary and beneficial to: 1) correct deficiencies, 2)
satisfy changes in operational and logistic support
requirements, 3) effect substantial life cycle cost
savings, and 4) prevent or allow desired slippage in an
approved schedule [Ref. 11: p. 5.2.12-2].
A change order under a Government contract is a
unique entity. It is a written order signed by the
Contracting Officer without the consent of the contractor,
directing the contractor to make "within scope" changes in
accordance with the Changes clause of the contract. [Ref.
12: p. 2] The Changes clause, a unique aspect of all
Government contracts, empowers the Contracting Officer to
make unilateral changes or modification to the contract
without any consent or consideration of the contractor or
his point of view [Ref. 9:pp. 282-286].
31
Navy policy dictates an adjustment to the price or
schedule of the contract be made through negotiations as
soon as possible so that the change order can be finalized
by a bilateral modification. Claims arise when an agreement
cannot be reached and the contractor alleges that the
compensation offered by the Government is insufficient to
cover the injury or harm he has suffered due to the impact
of the change. Additionally, contractors often allege that
there were unforeseeable costs associated with implementing
a particular change or that numerous changes resulted in a
cumulative impact beyond the impact of the local change.
Rather than pursue the negotiation process, the contractor
submits a claim for whatever costs and schedule changes he
feels are adequate [Ref. 10: p. 6].
A change order, whether formal or constructive, may
be outside the original scope of the contract. This type of
change is a breach of contract and is referred to as a
Cardinal Change. The scope of the contract may be exceeded
by the effect of one change or the cumulative effect of
several changes. The contractor has the responsibility to
inform the Government of changes it considers to be outside
the scope of the original contract [Ref. 9:p. 357].
However, it is often difficult to determine or agree on the
original scope of the contract during execution, especially
in the aftermath of several small changes.
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2. Late or Defective GFE and GFI
Government furnished equipment and information are
the equipment and data the Government contractually agrees
to provide the contractor. The complexity of Navy ships
requires the Navy to furnish the contractor detailed
drawings of a ship's design and equipment including:
information as to the equipment installed, equipment and
system testing requirements, maintenance procedures, power
requirements, form fit and function, and other similar
items. Most of the data are required to support the GFE and
are essential to successful completion of the repair effort.
The contractor relies extensively on this in developing
estimates and workload schedules required to proceed in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.
The listings of GFE (schedule "A" to the contract)
and GFI (schedule "B") are provided to the contractor prior
to contract award. These listings delineate what equipment
and information the contractor should anticipate receiving
along with the dates the equipment and data will be
supplied. The contractor develops his repair and delivery
schedules with the assumption that all Government Furnished
Material will arrive on time and be technically correct and
in proper working order [Ref 13:p. 27].
Often a portion of the equipment or data provided is
late, incorrect or defective. This in effect constitutes a
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constructive change and is a major contributor to ship
repair and overhaul contractor claims.
3. Economic and Contractual Causes
The basic goals and motivations of a business
concern are: 1) survive as a business entity, 2) realize
an economic profit, 3) maximize profits or the net worth of
the stockholders, and 4) establish a reputation as a good
citizen within the community [Ref. 14:p. 15]. The current
economic status of the United States' shipbuilding and
repair industry can be described as one where supply
significantly exceeds demand. The industry is dominated by
one customer, the United States Navy [Ref. 15:p. 37].
The majority of the firms in the ship repair and
overhaul aspects of the industry are operating in an
environment which reflects the first two goals of a firm,
survival and profit realization [Ref 15:p. 37]. This is an
extremely competitive environment which forces the
contractors to be both efficient and very aggressive in its
response to requests for bids or proposals. Often bids are
submitted with very low, and even zero profit margins.
These bids are submitted with the remote hope or belief that
the repair effort will proceed as planned, or all deviations
will be in favor of the contractor [Ref. 10:p. 12].
Occasionally a contractor submits a bid which is
unrealistic (below the contractor's cost to perform). This
tactic is often consistent with the first goal of a business
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concern, survival. Additionally, since the contractor is
aware of the Government's necessity for contract changes,
there is always the opportunity to improve its profit and
loss posture through sole source change negotiations [Ref.
ll:p. 3].
In each case, once awarded the contract, there is
the strong desire to realize a profit despite low-ball bids,
outright buy-ins, or poor management of the repair effort.
When faced with the possibility of substantial losses on a
contract, claims are generated for any actions or inactions
of the Government the contractor believes will substantiate
the claim [Ref, 10:p. 10].
The competitive environment of the ship repair and
overhaul industry is further impacted by the Navy's goal of
procuring repair and overhaul services at the lowest
possible cost and risk to the Government. The Navy's
vehicles for attaining these goals are competitive bids, and
the almost exclusive use of fixed-price contracts despite
the business risk or complexity of the repair effort [Ref.
16: p. 9]. The competitive environment and the monopsony
status of the Navy as a customer affords the contractor
little or no leverage in determining contract type [Ref.
17:p. 48].
There are situations where the fixed-price contracts
require the contractor to accept more than his fair share of
the cost, schedule, and performance risks. The competitive
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environment of the industry prevents the contractor from
pricing contingencies into the contract proposal to insulate
it against these business risks. Upon receipt of the
contract in high risk situations, the contractor will
attempt to avoid losses by pricing contingencies in change
proposals, failing to negotiate changes in a timely manner,
or attempt to recover losses through an omnibus claim at the
end of contract performance [Ref. 18 :p. 3].
4. Complex Cause and Effect Relationship
The most significant aspect of claims allegations
encompasses claims of delay and disruption. Almost every
change or modification to the contract involves delay and
disruption in some manner. In a contract delay and
disruption claim, the contractor generally alleges that
Government actions or inactions give rise to a cumulative,
magnified program impact, causing additional work,
disruptive inefficiencies, stretchout or delay of
production, and additional costs. "Program delay and
disruption are normally by far the largest claim elements in
dollar value, averaging over 50% of total dollars claimed."
[Ref. 10:p. 9]
The contractor alleges the cross-impact of
additional changes and the acceleration of work by the
Government creates a cumulative effect on the contract which
cannot be quantified at the time the change takes effect.
Under this concept, the inefficiencies of overtime and the
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synergistic cause-effect relationship of cumulative changes
on delay and disruption cannot be established in the price
of each individual change. The logic of this cumulative
cause-effect relationship is often utilized as the basis of
claims against the Government [Ref. 19:p. 4].
5. Other Causes of Claims
There are several other less prominent causes of
contractor claims in ship repair and overhaul. They include
delay and disruption due to acts of God; labor disturbances;
acts of the Government in its sovereign capacity; and the
inability of the SUPSHIP to promptly clarify controversial
issues or ambiguous specifications, provide additional
drawings and information, analyze requests for equitable
adjustment, negotiate changes, and adjudicate initial claims
due to inadequate staffing and personnel skills [Ref. 10: p.
13] .
An adverse business relationship between the
contractor and the SUPSHIP can have a very negative impact
on the resolution of disputes. To be effective in the
execution and administration of the contract and at the
negotiation table, a degree of trust must be established.
The entitlement of the contractor must be recognized. The
goal of the Contracting Officer and the contractor should be
to obtain a fair and reasonable price for the work
performed. The Contracting Officer should establish a
business relationship which conveys to the contractor that
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the Government is always willing to negotiate in good faith,
but will not compensate him for bad judgement and poor
management decisions. The absence of such a relationship
will encourage the contractor to seek resolution of his
disputes in another forum (as a claim with the ASBCA or
Court of Claims) , due to his conviction that he will not be
treated equitably by the local SUPSHIP [Ref. 5: para. 3-801].
E. CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SHIP REPAIR AND OVERHAUL
INDUSTRY
The shipbuilding and repair industry of the United
States is plagued by an excess of capacity and capability,
intense competition, a lack of commercial orders, a lack of
a commitment on behalf of the Government to maintain the
present industrial base, and a less than optimistic outlook
for the future [Ref. l:pp. 1-2].
The effect of the factors in the previous paragraph
results in a continuous reduction in the industrial base and
a migration of skilled ship repair and construction workers
to other sectors of the economy [Ref. 20:p. 1] . It has
created an extremely competitive environment in which
adverse business relationships exist between contractors and
the Government. The majority of the firms engaged in repair
and overhaul are in a survival mode. This competitive and
somewhat dismal economic environment is a primary reason for
the generation of contractor claims due to the submission of
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unrealistic bids in an attempt to maintain a business base
[Ref. 21:pp. 141].
In his January 1986 Report on the Industrial Base for
the Construction, Overhaul and Repair of Naval Vessels to
the U. S. Congress Armed Services Committee, Navy Secretary,
John Lehman characterized the industrial base as follows
[Ref. l:pp. 13-14]:
Lack of commercial orders and an inability to compete
price wise in the international market has made the
shipbuilding and repair industry virtually completely
dependent upon naval ship work. As a result, competition
for naval ship work is more intense and more yards are
involved in Navy business. The number of firms involved
in navy construction of vessels over 400 feet in length
increased from eight to seventeen between 1974 and 1984.
Entry of new firms into this industry or even movement of
current firms into different areas within it is very
difficult. . . .
Competition for repair work is extremely intense with only
the most efficient/productive yards obtaining repair work.
During the 1983-85 time period, 15 yards left the
industry.
In summary, there is more capability in the shipbuilding
and repair industry than there is work. Competition
results in acquiring and repairing ships in the most cost
efficient manner in the most productive shipyards.
Competition is making the mobilization base stronger by
providing the incentive to improve technology, streamline
methods, and reduce labor costs in order to win business.
A policy based on supporting a base would guarantee some
workload for a set of "essential" yards while a policy of
pure competition focuses on buying in the least expensive
manner. Support of a large, dispersed mobilization base,
capable of rapidly increased output, tends to require
actions which run counter to encouraging competition.
[Ref l:pp. 13-14]
The number of regular overhauls continue to decline due
to the increased use of the Phased Maintenance Availability
(PMA) concept. This concept and the increased
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maintainability of Navy ships will further reduce the repair
work available to the industry [Ref. l:p. 12].
Japan and South Korea continue to dominate the
international shipbuilding and repair industry (see Figure
2-2) . The inability of the U. S. Shipyards to compete in
the international market is well documented. In a speech to
the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers in
April 1984, Larry French, the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of National Steel Shipbuilding Company highlighted
the need for Government intervention to support the industry
[Ref. 22:p. 492].
Short of positive, corrective action by the Administration
and Congress to address this enduring and critical
commercial shipbuilding problem, the readiness and
reliability of an essential ingredient of national
security will be lacking when needed, in both quantity and
quality.
Both Congress and the Administration have been reluctant to
subsidize the industry due to its unfavorable competitive
position in the international market place and the
prohibitive cost of subsidies in an era of high budget
deficits and the Graham-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction
Act [Ref. l:p. 37].
F. SUMMARY
Claims avoidance is difficult in any contracting
environment. However, the complexity of ship repair and
ship repair contracting further complicate this process.
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and overhaul industry coupled with the Navy's policy of
awarding fixed-price contracts exclusively have created an
adverse business relationship between the Government and
many of its contractors.
Navy Ship Repair and Overhaul is conducted by is a
complex group of organizations charged with the procurement
of vast amounts of essential repair services. The mandate
of the Coordinator of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair is
to obtain these services at the least cost and risk to the
Government. Careful planning and the presence of a pre-
negotiated agreement (the MSR contract) , assist in coping
with the complexity of the repair process, however by its
very nature this process requires frequent changes to ship
repair contracts.
As the most prominent Government organization in the
process and the one which is in daily contact with the
contractor, the SUPSHIP is key in avoiding ship repair and
overhaul claims.
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III. REVIEW OF CRITICAL CLAIMS ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The bases for ship repair and overhaul claims were
introduced in the previous chapter. In addition to these
well documented causes of claims, this research identifies
specific claims issues and problems. Despite the expense,
time and effort the Navy spent in settling the enormous
shipbuilding claims of the 1970 's, the lessons learned have
still not been fully realized. Although the Navy has not
had a major shipbuilding claim in almost a decade, ship
repair and overhaul continues to be plagued by claims and
disputes. This researcher noted that the current underlying
reasons for claims in ship repair and overhaul are similar
to those for shipbuilding in the 1970' s. This is evident in
Rear Admiral Hopkins
'
, Former Deputy Commander For
Contracts, NAVSEA, opening remarks to students of a Claims
Lessons Learned Seminar conducted by the Navy Logistic
Management School on 13 October 1978. He stated that [Ref.
23:p. 3]:
In the early and mid-sixties, the shipbuilding industry
was confronted by a changing economic environment that was
accompanied by a change in the Navy contracting attitude.
The more significant of these changes were:
1. The Navy change from negotiated to advertised
procurement
.
2. Private shipyard capacities and capabilities were
taxed by relatively large order quantities.
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3. The bottom fell out of the labor market.
4. Procurement practices, combined with the shipbuilders'
need for Navy work, tended to encourage "buy- ins" on
competitive procurement.
5. Inflation significantly increased the cost of ship
construction over several years between a shipyard bid
and delivery of the ship.
Each of these factors contributed to unplanned expenses
and operating losses. At the same time, the contractors
were continuing to experience problems stemming from
defective plans and specifications, late and defective
GFE/GFI, and the incorporation of a multitude of Navy ship
design changes.
Although the current inflation rate is relatively modest and
the period of performance for repair is much shorter than
construction, this comparison is genuine. In identifying
the current critical claims issues and problems, the
researcher gathered and reviewed recent literature and
conducted personal and telephone interviews.
B. CURRENT CLAIMS ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
Although several problems and issues were surfaced, the
following three issues gained consensus among interviewees
and were found in the literature: 1) contract cost growth
due to excessive changes; 2) the inability of the Navy to
develop complete and definitive specification packages; and
3) the use of firm fixed-price contracts in a highly
competitive industry when the previous two issues are
applicable. The most controversial issue was the use of
cumulative delay and disruption as a basis for the
submission of a claim by the contractor.
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1. Contract Cost Growth
Contract cost growth in ship repair and overhaul
results from changes to the contract after contract award.
Cost growth is a well documented occurrence present in
virtually every repair effort. These changes take the form
of growth or new work. Growth is a contract change within
the scope of the original repair contract. Changes that do
not meet this criteria are new work. New work requirements
should be processed as new acquisitions, using current
fiscal year funds. Growth work may be funded using funds
authorized for the initial acquisition [Ref. 24:p. 7].
Cost growth is of great concern because the changes
are negotiated in a sole-source environment which often
places the Navy at a disadvantage. Furthermore, contract
changes usually contribute to overhaul delays and are the
bases for almost all claims and disputes [Ref. 25:p. 5].
GAO's analysis of contract cost growth suggests that
the bulk of the problems are with the Navy's development of
work packages for repairs, maintenance, and minor
modifications. The analysis of 119 overhauls conducted in
private shipyards from 1977 through 1981 revealed that
excessive contract changes delayed overhauls an average of
64 days and resulted in cost growth over the award price of
an average of 62 percent for frigates, 55% for auxiliary
ships, and 29% for amphibious ships [Ref. 18:p. 9]. Figure
3-1 is germane.
45
CONTRACT Growth due to
No. of Contract Growth Spec chancres New work





Amphibious 31 $271.6 46 80 20
Auxiliaries 49 275.4 46 73 27
Frigates 25 230.0 56 77 23
Destroyers 14 76.0 59 86 11
Total 119 $853.0 50 77 23
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office Report, B-133170
Figure 3-1 Summary of Contract Cost Growth
Interviewees from both Government and industry cited
contract cost growth as possibly the most significant issue
in generating contractor claims. Government personnel
stated that changes provide contractors in a loss posture,
due to poor management or contract buy- ins, with the
opportunity to realize a profit at the expense of the Navy
and the taxpayers. They utilize their advantageous
negotiating position and the Navy's desire to maintain the
overhaul schedule to obtain a higher than justified profit
margin. Most changes are negotiated in a concurrent (while
the work is in progress) or a retrospective environment.
The contractor's cost and performance risks are
significantly reduced because he is well aware of the scope
of work required or he knows the actual cost incurred.
46
Contractors contend that excessive changes to the contract
diminish efficiency by requiring the use of overtime and the
hiring of additional workers, who are less skilled and
higher on the learning curve than those workers currently on
the job. In addition to employing more than the optimum
number of workers on a job, less skilled personnel require a
reduction in the span of supervision and increase material
job rework. The administrative burden is increased to
accommodate scheduling difficulties, prepare proposals and
negotiate the changes. The additional administrative burden
on both the Government and contractor in negotiating cost
growth changes is significant. It contributes to adversity
in the business relationship, complicates negotiations of
REAs, and slows settlement of claims and disputes.
2. Work Package Specification Shortfalls
The Navy's inability to provide complete and
accurate specification of its work packages is the most
significant cause of repair changes, contract cost growth
and contractor claims. GAO's analysis (see Figure 3-1) in
its review of overhauls found that 77 percent of the
contract cost growth in overhauls was due to work package
specification shortfalls [Ref. 18:p. 9], In an analysis of
cost growth due to work package shortfalls, GAO concluded
that:
... 82 percent of the cost was fleet funded. Therefore,
regarding cost growth , the most significant problem
appears to be developing work packages covering repairs
and maintenance. [Ref. 18 :p. 9]
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The major problem with specifications is that
referenced documents of specifications are often obsolete or
conflicting. Specifications are either too general or too
restrictive and often fail to take advantage of the
technical state of the art in ship systems [Ref. 11 :p. 2.1-
1] . Work package development is further complicated because
a large part of the repair work is not definitized until
after contract award and commencement of the overhaul even
though work packages are determined months in advance of the
start of work. A further problem occurs when operational
requirements of a given ship may require the ship check
(necessary to develop the work package) be performed on a
sister ship rather than the ship actually going into
overhaul [Ref. 26:para. 2].
Ship repair work packages on sister ships or ships
of the same type can differ significantly. A 1980 Navy
study of destroyers revealed that only 50 percent of the
overhaul work recurs from ship to ship. This reality is
being further complicated by the complexity of the ships in
the fleet today. A recent request for an equitable
adjustment by a contractor conducting an overhaul of a DD-
963 class destroyer highlights this point. The primary
reason for the request for cost and schedule adjustment was
[Ref. 27:topic 1]
:
The mandatory drawing changes affect all phases of the
work package including ripout, arrangement, new hardware
and testing. These changes affect both the primary and
secondary work path items. The 355 mandatory drawing
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changes affected the crafts in that they had to
reincorporate wholesale changes to all major blueprints.
This voluminous efforts net effect was to bog down the
production effort to a stalemate and negate the total
preplanning effort. The overall schedule slippage to USS
can be primarily attributed to these mandatory
changes
.
The 355 drawing changes were submitted to the contractor
shortly after contract award.
Interviewees from both Government and industry cited
the specification work package as a source of frustration.
Work package specifications were identified as the major
generator of inspection deficiency reports (IDRs) and are
featured prominently in almost all contract problem reports
(CPRs) . Government interviewees stated progress has been
made, however, improvement is still required. Poorly
written or referenced specifications often allow dual
interpretation of the intent or requirement. The
Government, as the specification writer, is responsible for
its content in claims and disputes. Another problem is that
the planning SUPSHIP which composes the specification work
package often is not the same SUPSHIP which administers the
overhaul . This lack of "hands-on" expertise delays
responses to IDRs and impact the repair effort. Next to
changes to the contract, contractors, cited the
specification work package as a major source of disruption
to the repair effort. General or inconsistent
specifications require the submission to SUPSHIP of an IDR.
Often SUPSHIPs fail to respond rapidly to the IDR, or
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approval of the change must be obtained from the TYCOM or
NAVSEA. These delays disrupt scheduled work and cost the
contractor and the Government money. Also restrictive
specifications may prevent the utilization of the best
approach for methods of repair. Finally, less than adequate
work package specifications degrade the quality of bids or
proposals. They require additional time and talent to
analyze and interpret the specifications, and additional
communications with the contracting officer during the
solicitation process.
3. Adverse Business Relationship
Interviews with both contractors and Government
personnel highlighted the existence of an adverse
relationship between the Government and its contractors.
The controversy was more pronounced in certain areas. It
was extremely high on the West coast, especially among the
southern California contractors, and relatively mild to
almost non-existent among some East and Gulf coast
contractors. Most interviewees agreed the controversy
centers on two issues: 1) The competitive and declining
industry, and 2) The Navy's procurement policies.
Contractors contend the Navy is taking unfair advantage of
the industry's competitive spirit by pushing for lower costs
and forcing contractors to accept stringent schedules and
firm fixed-priced contracts, especially when the Navy cannot
adequately define its requirements. Navy acquisition
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personnel view the controversy quite differently. They
maintain the Navy is exercising sound business judgement in
obtaining the required repair services at the best price and
lowest risk to the Government. In an attempt to protect
themselves, the Navy has implemented initiatives to
discourage contract buy-ins, for example unusually low bids
are questioned to ensure mistakes were not made in the
composition of the contractor bid.
Government personnel stated contractors will submit
extremely low bids or buy-in to get the contract. Once
awarded the contract, the contractor attempts to recover
cost and make a profit by taking advantage of its sole-
source position in negotiating changes to the contract.
Contractors contend Government personnel add to the
animosity of the relationship by delaying action on REAs and
contractor claims. Additionally, they say the Navy is often
insensitive in its exercise of control of the contract
through the ability to stop work and make unilateral changes
to the contract.
A GAO study concluded the atmosphere of distrust
between the contracting parties may be attributable to the
Navy's contracting policies [Ref. 18:p. 37]. A recent
article in the Wall Street Journal (May 29, 1987), "Navy May
Have Pressed To Hard On Shipyards For Low-Cost Fleet As
Expenses Keep Mounting" states the following [Ref. 17 :p.
48] :
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When the Reagan administration launched its ambitious
plans for a 600-ship Navy, officials made a widely
publicized and widely applauded, push for more competition
and lower cost form the nation's shipbuilders. But as the
bills came in, some of the anticipated savings may turn
out to be short-lived.
Hans K. Shaeffer, Chairman of Todd Shipyards Corp. also
blames the decline of the industry on the Navy procurement
policies adopted by the Reagan administration.
Policies like fixed price contracts, awarding contracts to
the lowest bidder, whether the bidder can deliver or not,
and forcing builders to pay for the cost of retooling
their plants are driving shipbuilders out of business.
[Ref. 15:p. 37]
Todd Shipyard Corp. is currently facing sale or
restructuring after losses stemming from two overhaul
contracts and failure to win the contract to build the DDG-
51 class destroyer [Ref. 17:p. 48].
4. Fragmented Navy Planning and Management System
The Navy's planning and management system for
overhaul and repair is fragmented with many organizations
involved in the coordination and decision making process
[Ref 18:p. 3]. The Type Commander has indirect control of
overhaul funds. He is responsible for the ship being in
overhaul and has the authority to approve or disapprove most
of the work in the work package. However, NAVSEA is
responsible for the ship's configuration and approves all
alterations and modifications to systems. NAVSEA provides
the technical information as well as the funds to conduct
these changes [Ref. 24:pp. 37-38].
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The SUPSHIP coordinates and administers contract
requirements which flow down from NAVSEA, the TYCOM and the
ship. The level of SUPSHIP' s authority in approving any
changes is strictly limited by the guidance provided by the
TYCOM or NAVSEA [Ref. 24:p. 38].
The lack of concentrated expertise and central
management responsibility for the overhaul fails to provide
timely and accurate answers to the following questions [Ref.
18:p. ii]
.
1) Who can ensure that work specification packages are
complete and accurate?
2) Who is in a position to make timely and informed
decisions on proposed changes to contracts?.
3) Who can assure that work is of the required quality?.
4) Who has visibility to provide reliable feedback on a
ship's overhaul?
Government and contractor personnel alike cited the
inability of SUPSHIP personnel to provide timely replies and
decisions to the contractor as a source of animosity. The
absence of prompt decisions on changes, REAs and IDRs
contributes to overhaul delays and disrupts the repair
effort.
5. The Procurement Process
The fact that the sealed bid contracting method
results in contractor buy-ins is well document in previous
sections of this study. However, NAVSEA has recently
initiated a modified source selection method. A firm fixed-
price type contract is awarded to the responsible offeror
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submitting the lowest priced, technically acceptable
proposal. Each offeror submits a technical proposal and a
separate, sealed price proposal. A technical evaluation
team evaluates each technical proposal, while the price
proposals remain sealed. The price proposals of all
technically acceptable, responsible offeror are opened after
they are found technically qualified. The price proposals
of offerors submitting technically unacceptable proposals
are retained unopened [Ref. 28].
This method of source selection has been protested
unsuccessfully by offerors with unacceptable technical
proposals, as a violation of full and open competition under
the Competition in Contracting Act. Contractors contend
that NAVSEA should consider their price and technical
proposals together and not reject their offer on technical
proposal evaluation alone.
Another NAVSEA initiative was implemented on 22
April 1986 when COMNAVSEASYSCOM promulgated the Private
Sector Ship Repair Cost Control Initiatives. The purposes
of these initiatives were to make unrealistically low offers
(buy-ins) an unattractive business strategy and to obtain
timely performance of changed work at fair and reasonable
prices. The initiatives include the following [Ref. 29 ]:
1) A post-overhaul RAV or similar follow-on availability.
This will permit separate competition for new work,
and non-critical path growth work that can be deferred
as necessary from the principal availability.
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2) Additional Government Requirements (AGR) clauses by
which each offerer includes in its pricing a
reasonable amount of labor, specified in the
solicitation (currently 20% of the repair effort) , to
be used for completing growth work. Repair schedule
should accommodate growth work being time phased into
the overhaul or availability without impact.
3) Notification in the solicitation that the Navy may
exercise its rights under the "Access to Vessels"
clause of the MSR agreement. This permits the Navy to
employ a third party to complete growth and essential
new work, when the initial prime contractor fails to
negotiate a fair and reasonable price.
All the contractor interviewees stated that the initiatives
were unfair business practices and the Shipbuilders Council
of America has challenged their legality in court.
Contractors expressed the opinion that it is extremely
unfair to require them to preprice growth work before the
effort begins. At this time neither the contractor nor the
Navy can determine where and what type of growth work will
be encountered. Third party access is even more
controversial. Contractors contend that under this
initiative the Government alone determines what prices are
fair and reasonable. If a contractor refuses to accept the
Government's definition of a fair and reasonable price, it
faces the probability that one of its competitors will be
the third party with access to its work site. This would
provide a competitor with the opportunity to view propriety
work procedures or have access to trade secrets which would
enhance its competitive position for future contracts.
Deferring certain work was not an issue.
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A majority (approximately 75%) of the Government
personnel interviewed favored the initiatives. Those
individuals who opposed the initiatives expressed objections
similar to those cited above concerning the prepricing of
growth work. All Government personnel expressed strong
support for deferring non-critical work items and were
generally supportive of third party access. Several
Government personnel thought the AGR clauses should be
amended to include subcontractors growth work and that
growth work that results from defective specifications
should be excluded.
Currently, these initiatives have not eliminated the
unusually low contractor bids. Instead, several contractors
have priced their growth work rate below their forward
pricing rate agreement (FPRA) . This practice will further
impact a loss posture if the contractor bought-into the
contract originally. All Government personnel interviewed
believe the AGR clause will increase claims and disputes in
the near future. Difficulty has already been encountered in
negotiating the hours required to conduct prepriced growth
work. Also, there have been attempts on the part of
contractors to redefine what is growth work and new work.
New work is not prepriced under this initiative.
6. The Competitive and Declining Industry
All Government and contractor personnel supported
the opinion that the shipbuilding and repair industry is
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extremely competitive and that the future for a large number
of contractors is bleak. A recent article in Navy Times
(June 1, 1987), "Dismal Future For U.S. Shipbuilding"
highlighted this observation. It stated the following [Ref.
15:p. 37]:
For virtually all the nation's major shipyards there is
only one customer—the U.S. Navy.
And with the 600-ship fleet nearly complete, shipbuilding
executives are worried about where their company's next
contract is coming from. For many, there may be no more.
In the last six years the number of skilled shipbuilders
in the United States has declined by almost half-from
135,000 to 70,000, according to Paul J. Burnsky, President
of the Metal Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. Were it
not for the Navy's expanded building program toward the
600-ship goal, the toll would be even greater. New orders
for merchant vessels are non-existent. And when the 600-
ship Navy is complete, our industrial outlook will become
even more grim.
Hans K. Schaeffer, Chairman of Todd Shipyard Corp.
contends the shipbuilding industry in the United States is
on its way to extinction. He blames much of the decline
on the Navy procurement policies adopted by the Reagan
administration
.
While there is little doubt that the shipbuilding
and repair industry of the United States will continue to
exist, it is not known which contractors engaged in ship
repair will remain in business. Several Government and
contractor interviewees predicted that over the next five
years, 3 to 4 percent of the ship repair and overhaul
industrial base will no longer exist. They believe most
casualties will be among the contractors which have failed
to invest in modern, efficient facilities.
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An executive of a large shipyard outlined the
following criteria for survival:
1) Invest in modern efficient, facilities
2) Maintain skilled labor at a reasonable wage rate
3) Pursue aggressive bidding for repair and overhaul work
He stated that the contractors with work will survive, even
if the cost of performance exceeds the contract price. Any
contractor faced with the prospect of liquidation if
unsuccessful in obtaining an award can underbid the cost of
performance up to liquidation costs. For example, XYZ Corp
is facing net liquidation cost of $10 million. It receives
an IFB from the local SUPSHIP for overhaul of a Navy ship.
It can underbid its cost by $9,999,999. From a purely
economic point of view the contractor has improved its
financial status. This executive admitted that buy-ins do
occur, and once into a contract, there is the strong desire
of each business entity to make a profit. The Navy often
provides that opportunity through changes and inadequate
work package specifications.
7. Cumulative Delay and Disruption
Cumulative delay and disruption refers to the
additional impact on all changed and unchanged work. It
reflects the fact that the interaction between two or more
change orders generates delay and disruption beyond that for
each individual change [Ref. 19:p. 4].
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Currently, cumulative delay and disruption is the
reason most often given as the basis for claims submitted.
Both contractor and Government personnel alike have strong
opinions on this issue. Cumulative delay and disruption
claims are extremely subjective and difficult to quantify
,
audit, or establish entitlement. The contractors contend
that the cumulative cause-effect relationship that generates
cumulative delay and disruption cannot be measured when the
original change occurred. This is why the magnitude of
changes made in almost every repair effort dictate a
legitimate recognition of this basis. Most Government
personnel expressed the opinion that since the Government
pays the contractor to plan and manage the overhaul work,
including changes in a timely manner, cumulative delay and
disruption should not be allowed.
Additionally, there is no legal precedent for
utilizing cumulative delay and disruption as a basis for
claims [Ref. 19:p. 1] . However, both contractor and
Government personnel note that the Government does recognize
the existence of this cause-effect relationship in its
claims settlements. It poses a difficult problem in
establishing a quantum due to its subjective nature. In a
repair effort where contract cost growth is significant, the
contractor can claim entitlement after the fact and obtain
an unjustified settlement.
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8. Other Claims Issues and Problems
Late and defective GFM continues to be a major
contributor to contractor claims [Ref. 30:p. 27]. The Navy
generally does not hold vendors responsible for the repair
or replacement of defective GFM. SUPSHIPs often contract
for repairs by the overhaul contractor or an onsite vendor
representative to expedite the repair process [Ref. 31 :p.
12] .
Several contractors stated that Government personnel
often effectively accelerate repair contracts by making
changes to the contract but then refusing to extend the
overhaul schedule. This situation makes it very difficult
for the contractor to change the schedule, continue to
produce quality work, and maintain the level of efficiency
required to realize a profit.
Contractor and Government personnel expressed
concern over the reduction of progress payments for ship
repair and overhaul from 90 percent to 80 percent. This
reduction is expected to cause additional financial strains
on an already depressed industry. Several Government
personnel are concerned that this situation may prompt some
contractors to more readily convert REA's to claims, whereas
contractors feared that a reduction in cash flow and the
threat of additional withholding would further degrade their
negotiation position in adjudicating changes, REA's and
claims.
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SUPSHIP's staffing was noted by contractors and
several Contracting Officers as inadequate to efficiently
perform required functions. Contractors were of the opinion
that, as a whole the quality of personnel was less than
optimum due to the lower Government pay scale and its
inability to terminate marginal or below par performers.
Most Contracting Officers were pleased with the quality of
their personnel and their staffing level for routine
operations, however, stated that an inordinate number of
claims require reassignment of personnel to meet the
contract dispute requirements and seriously impact routine
operations.
C. SUMMARY
A variety of critical claims issues and problems have
been discussed. The most important of these is the
complexity of the ship repair and overhaul process coupled
with the fragmented repair management organization. These
factors make changes to the contract an integral part of the
repair effort. Additionally, the dismal economic status of
the industry and the Navy's contracting policies have
created an extremely difficult environment in which to
negotiate changes and avoid claims.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. INTRODUCTION
Claims and claims avoidance techniques in Government
acquisition are well studied subjects. Procedures and
recommendations for avoiding and settling claims are
addressed in several independent and Government commissioned
studies, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and the local
regulations and instructions of virtually every procurement
organization in the Federal Government.
The ship repair and overhaul organization is no
exception to the above generalization. The enormous $3.6
billion shipbuilding claims of the 1970' s prompted several
studies. The most in-depth study was the "Naval Ship
Procurement Process Study" which focused on new construction
contract awards from FY 1960 to 1978. This study included
analyses of outstanding shipbuilding claims; data on
contracting policies, contract types and clauses; total
change orders; and other aspects of the shipbuilding
industry and Navy procurement process [Ref. 21:pp. 1-4].
The complexity of claims negotiations can be highlighted by
the fact that these claims were settled for an average of 36
cents on the dollar of the original amount ($1.3 billion).
Over 40 percent of the settlement employed P.L. 85-804
provisions, indicating that strict entitlement procedures
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alone are often inadequate to effect final settlement of
claims [Ref. 32:pp. 150-151].
The economic reality facing the shipbuilding and repair
industry is grave [Ref. 15: p. 37]. Interviewees stated that
the decline in the Navy's shipbuilding program (as the goal
of the 600-ship fleet is attained) , coupled with a reduction
in the number of overhauls conducted in private shipyards,
will force a downward restructuring of the industrial base.
This reduction in overhauls is due to an increase in the
number of ships in the phased maintenance program [Ref.
l:p. 10]. This maintenance policy was outlined in Secretary
Pyatt's, ASN (S&L) , testimony before the Armed Services Sea
Power Subcommittee on 26 February 1986 [Ref. 33:p. 2]:
Since 1981, we have drastically changed our ship
maintenance philosophy. We have moved from an era where
major overhauls occurred every three years to one in which
a major overhaul now occurs about every five years with
short, maintenance-intensive Selected Restricted
Availabilities (SRAs) occurring about every 18 months
between overhauls. Thus, we have seen a shift from many
ROHs annually and many SRAs. These new maintenance
concepts have served the taxpayer well—both minimizing
the expenditure of repair dollars, while at the same time
substantially increasing the operational availability of
our ships.
As this evolution occurs, the Navy will continue to face
difficulties with claims issues and problems in the
administration of ship repair and overhaul contracts in an
increasingly competitive industry. An accurate
understanding of the causes of claims avoidance techniques
and management practices is required to ensure the Navy
receives the best possible ship repair services at a fair
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and reasonable price. Also, fair and equitable contracting
methods must be employed to ensure the most efficient
contractors remain a part of this vital industrial base.
B. CURRENT TREND IN CONTRACTOR CLAIMS
The current trend in ship repair and overhaul claims
over the past five quarters has been a slight decline in the
total dollar value claimed with a corresponding increase in
the number of claim actions (see Figure 4-1) . Requests for
equitable adjustment over the same period showed no definite
trend [Ref. 34 :p. 2].
The opinions of Government personnel interviewed were
that the trend in contractors 1 claims would increase
gradually in both the number of claims filed and the
cumulative claim value. This increase would be driven by
the industry's depressed economic status and the Navy's
continued use of fixed-price type contracts in high work
growth situations. They observed that more claims are being
filed for smaller dollar values than in the past. This
could be a reflection of added financial pressure on the
contractor or the desire to recover all perceived
entitlement. Both industry and Government personnel expect
the trend to continue to increase until the supply in the
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Figure 4-1 Ship Repair & Overhaul Claims
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C. CURRENT CONTRACTING METHODS
The current contracting method for the acquisition of
ship repair and overhaul services is the use of fixed-price
type contracts. An ASN(S&L) memorandum directs all ship
overhauls be conducted on a firm fixed-price or fixed-price
incentive basis. Single ship SRAs of less than six months
duration will be awarded as firm fixed-price contracts by
the local SUPSHIPs rather than as multi-ship SRA cost type
contracts formerly awarded by NAVSEA headquarters [Ref.
35 :p. 1] . An interview with the Surface Ship Overhaul
Acquisition Branch Head advised that all future contracts
for the Phased Maintenance Program would be fixed-price in
accordance with ASN(ASL) guidance. Cost-plus-award-fee
(CPAF) contracts were previously used to obtain ship repair
services under the phased maintenance concept [Ref. l:p.
10] .
Although the fixed-price contract is mandated for all
ship repair and overhaul services, incentive or award fee
features can be included to motivate contractor performance.
The fixed-price incentive contract provides the contractor
with the incentive to control cost. If he can keep the cost
of performance below the target cost, he will share in the
contract cost savings based on the predetermined share
ratio. If costs exceed the target cost of the contract, he
must share the higher cost of performance, at the expense of
profit, with the Government up to the ceiling price. All
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costs above the ceiling price must be borne by the
contractor alone.
The award fee aspect of the fixed-price contract is
infrequently employed. A firm fixed-price is obtained
through the sealed bid source selection process, and a
performance fee is established to encourage and reward
superior contractor performance. Performance categories
(e.g., schedule, technical and management) are established
and assigned weights based on their importance to the repair
effort. Evaluation periods are also established and a
percent of the fee is allocated to each period. Carry over
criteria are established for the remainder of the fee not
earned in the evaluation period. [Ref. 36:pp. 71-73]
The Navy changed the policy of assigning ships to
overhaul in May 1985 from regional to coastwide. This
policy was designed to increase competition by providing
private shipyards located away from fleet homeports the
opportunity to bid on all ship repair contracts over six
months duration. It also would distribute the repair
workload among private shipyards and add to the industrial
base. Since Selected Restricted Availabilities normally are
planned to take less than six months, private shipyards in
the homeport areas will continue to receive this work [Ref.
25:p. 9].
The phased maintenance program is a relatively new
method of obtaining repair services in the Navy. Currently
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it is an element of the Auxiliary and Amphibious ship
maintenance strategy. It utilizes a series of short Phased
Maintenance Availabilities (PMAs) instead of regular
overhauls. The PMA repairs are defined to the actual
material condition of the ship. This program incorporates
multi-ship, multi-year contracts which in the future will be
fixed-price. It utilizes the talents of a port engineer to
coordinate the repair effort which involves the contractor
in the advance planning. This planning concept has fostered
continuity in maintenance management and instills a
proprietary interest in the repair effort by the contractor
[Ref. l:p. 10].
Contractors interviewed for this study thought the use
of a fixed-price contract for multi-ship, multi-year repair
services would destroy this spirit of coordination and
cooperation. The fixed-price contract would result in low
bids and a lack of coordination. Government personnel
agreed with this statement; they felt the fixed-price
contract would prompt the contractor to cut corners on
performance to reduce cost.
D. CLAIMS AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES
Claims avoidance techniques were found to be the same or
similar in all repair organizations visited or interviewed
for this study. Each SUPSHIP has a claims avoidance group
of varying size and talents as a part of either its
Contracts department or Business Review department. A
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claims avoidance instruction is in effect identifying the
members of the claims avoidance team and their
responsibilities. NAVSEA has a Claims Prevention and
Negotiation Branch in its Contract Administration and Claims
Settlement Division, (Code 028) . NAVSEA (Code 028) provides
claims avoidance training to the local SUPSHIPs in addition
to guidance and assistance in claims adjudication.
SUPSHIP's policy is to analyze and negotiate changes,
request for equitable adjustments (REAs) and claims as
rapidly as possible based upon the resources available and
the cooperation obtained from the contractor. Government
interviewees were aware of the competitive nature in the
ship repair industry and the propensity for buy-ins. The
prevailing SUPSHIP attitude was that if we aren't aggressive
in our replies to Inspection Deficiency Reports (IDRs)
,
Contract Problem Reports (CPRs) , and adjudicating changes
and REAs in a timely manner, the contractor will recover
losses or improve his profit posture by successfully showing
that the Government delayed or disrupted his repair effort.
The general attitude of everyone involved in claims
avoidance is evident in an internal NAVSEA memorandum
concerning the claim of a particular contractor [Ref. 38 :p.
2].
(Contractor) has a long history of submitting inflated
claims and REAs and then attempting to pressure the
contracting officer, by alleging-sometimes quite
emotionally-that the Navy is not negotiating in good faith
or is using financial leverage to force an unfair
settlement. Our current approach is to analyze
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(contractor's) claims as quickly as possible.
Unfortunately, (contractor) does not always cooperate and
an acceptable review requires several months of
investigation. Once we feel comfortable with our
analysis, we open negotiations with (contractor) on those
areas where we believe he is entitled to compensation. In
the event of an impasse, we will quickly prepare a
Contracting Officer's final decision and issue it. We are
prepared to pay any supported entitlement in selected
cases.
Some frustration was expressed by interviewees with the
Navy procurement policy which prevents the assignment of
contract type based on the risk of performance involved.
Several Government personnel were of the opinion that there
are times when the complexity of the repair work and the
uncertainty of performance justify the utilization of a cost
type contract. Routinely, cost type contracts usually
require more resources to administer [Ref. 10:p. 23].
However, the interviewees related that a fixed-price
contract in a highly complex ship repair effort requires
close monitoring of the contractor. If the contractor's bid
was unrealistically low, change negotiations are likely to
occur in a hostile environment with an aggressive contractor
attempting to improve his financial posture in this
contract. Additionally, there is the higher possibility of
a claim. Add to this the. resources required to investigate
and negotiate the claim, plus the cost of litigation, if
required, and the resources required to administer and
settle a fixed-price contract in an inappropriate situation
could easily exceed the resources required to administer a
cost type contract.
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The implementation of the Private Sector Ship Repair
Cost Control initiatives have failed to force realistic bids
and avoid controversial change negotiations, according to
the majority of Government personnel interviewed. The
biggest obstacle to the success of the initiatives is the
fierce competition within the industry. In order to obtain
repair and overhaul contracts, contractors not only submit
extremely low bids on base work but also on the prepriced
growth work. This tactic increases the impact of the
contractor's loss or profit posture and creates a more
adverse attitude in negotiating labor hours on prepriced
growth work and new procurement for new work.
NAVSEA policy requires the submission of "lessons
learned" within 90 days after settlement of a claim to
NAVSEA (Code 028) . This memorandum report discusses the
lessons learned from claims analyses and suggests actions to
avoid the recurrence of similar claims [Ref. 8:p. 9].
Research indicates the SUPSHIPs are not currently complying
with this requirement.
E. PROPOSED CONTRACTING METHODS AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
TO AVOID CONTRACTOR CLAIMS
A summary of the suggested contracting methods and
management practices for the avoidance of claims obtained
from the literature and personnel interviews are as follows.
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1. Selective Use of Contract Type
The Navy should employ the selective use of cost
(CPAF) and fixed-price (FFP, FPI, and FPAF) contracts to
reflect the complexity of business risk in the repair
effort. A significant aspect of a claims prevention program
involves the type, technical content, and clause structure
of the contract. The two primary determinants of contract
type are technical uncertainty and cost uncertainty, in that
order. High technical uncertainty indicates the use of a
cost type contract and low technical uncertainty indicates
the use of a fixed-price type contract [Ref. 10:p. 22].
The fixed-price contract provides a clear cut
incentive for the contractor to control cost, even at the
expense of quality. The cost type contract provides the
Government the means to assure quality. An award fee
feature allows the Government to emphasize the area of
performance which it considers most important [Ref. 10 :p.
23] .
The majority of Government and contractor
interviewees agreed that these four contract types should be
utilized to obtain ship repair and overhaul services. This
choice of contracts will allow the Government to select the
contract type to obtain the required repair services at a
fair and reasonable price and avoid claims.
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2. Modified Source Selection Procedures
Interviewees indicated that NAVSEA should continue
to utilize the modified source selection process to ensure
the selection of technically competent performers. This
source selection method enables the Navy to more effectively
eliminate marginal performers with unacceptable technical
proposals from consideration, thereby improving the chances
of attaining an effective overhaul [Ref. 18:p. 39].
This source selection process still maintains
competition by requiring the submission of a technical
proposal separate from the cost proposal . Only the cost
proposals from offerors found technically qualified will be
opened. Award will be made to the lowest responsible
offeror [Ref. 28] . Additionally, the more competent




Minimize Contract Cost Growth
The Navy should minimize contract cost growth by
reducing the number of changes to the contract and improving
the specification work package. Contract cost growth is the
result of excessive changes to the repair contract due to
the Navy's problem with developing work packages for
repairs, maintenance and minor modifications. Contract
changes not only result in negotiations in a sole source
environment, but often contribute to overhaul delays and are
the primary reason for contractor claims [Ref. 18:pp. i,ii].
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4. Improve Business Relationships
Interviewees believed the business relationship
between the Navy and several of its ship repair contractors
could be improved through better communication of
requirements, an improved economic environment for the
industry, and a change in the Navy's procurement policy.
Government interviewees stated that adverse business
relationships stemmed from the competitive nature of the
industry. Contractors making a reasonable profit do not
file claims, and business transactions are conducted in an
amicable environment. Contractors contend the Navy's use of
fixed-price contracts (primarily FFP and FPIF) , stringent
repair schedules and unfair contract clauses (e.g.,
Additional Government requirements) add to the animosity of
the business relationship. Increased communications, timely
adjudication of changes and REAs, and prompt responses to
IDRs will improve business relationships. Also, a
consideration of the contractor's opinion regarding schedule
adjustments and technical problems in the issuing of changes
to the contract was an item contractors cited to improve
relationships
.
5. Reject Unrealistic Bids
Interviewees indicated that the Navy should adopt a
policy of outright rejection of bids that guarantee a loss
to the contractor if no changes are made to the contract.
This would be consistent with the DOD policy of paying a
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fair and reasonable price for services provided to the
Government [Ref. 5:para. 3-801]. Government personnel
stated the policy should require automatic rejection of a
bid of a specified percent (30% or more) below the
Government estimate or the average of the bids from all
competing offerors.
6. Concentrate More Expertise and Key Management
Responsibilities at the SUPSHIP Level
The Navy's planning and management system for
private sector overhauls is fragmented, with many
organizations involved in the decisionmaking process. No
single entity seems to have the expertise or managerial
responsibility for ensuring the success of a repair or
overhaul. Concentration of ship repair expertise and
managerial responsibility at the SUPSHIP level would [Ref.
18:pp. ii, 26]
:
a) improve work specifications packages
b) provide timely and informed decisions of proposed
changes to the contract
c) assure work is of the required quality
d) provide reliable feedback
e) control cost by ensuring only the required work is
authorized.
Government interviewees cited this proposed policy as an
effective means of improving the repair process. If SUPSHIP
controls over funds and contract changes were increased,
more timely decisions could be provided in response to IDRs
and the adjudication of changes and REAs.
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7. Improve the Delivery of Government Furnished
Material
Timely delivery and management of GFM requires [Ref.
30:p. 27]:
a) early identification of GFM requirements
b) verification of requirements
c) timely delivery of GFM.
Government personnel stated the contractor should be
required to adjust the dates GFM is required when changes to
the contract or repair schedule alter the date material is
required. Additionally, the increased use of Contractor
Furnished Material (CFM) for common items would reduce the
workload of personnel providing GFM.
8. Address Cumulative Delay And Disruption
A methodology for forward pricing the cumulative
delay and disruption impact of a change order is necessary
to effectively estimate total cost. The method could
include the application of predetermined factors to the
price of a negotiated change to account for its anticipated
cumulative impact [Ref. 38:p. 6]. Both Government and
contractor interviewees advocated some method of
recognizing the cumulative delay and disruption impact of
contract changes. However, attempts by SUPSHIP San Diego to
negotiate such an agreement was unsuccessful. An agreement
on the factors could not be attained [Ref. 38:pp. 9-12].
The prime objective should be to obtain a waiver or full
release of the contractor's rights with respect to the
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cumulative effect of delay and disruption up to that point
in contractor performance. [Ref.39:p. 257],
9. Other Methods And Techniques
Government interviewees believe the Navy should
implement measures to deny contractors in a loss position,
due to contract buy-in or poor management, the opportunity
to recover cost. Accordingly, extra effort is required to
ensure that unavoidable changes are reasonably priced and
that cost growth within the contract is properly identified
and kept to a minimum [Ref. ll:p. 5.51-8].
Both Government and contractor interviewees
suggested that the Navy, DOD, and Congress formulate a
comprehensive policy with respect to the maintenance of the
shipbuilding and repair mobilization industrial base. A
clear cut policy from Congress regarding the support, or
lack of support, in attaining commercial contracts and the
procurement policies of the Navy would assist marginal
contractors in determining future operations. At the
present time, marginal contractors are more apt to submit
unrealistic bids and file contractor claims. Such a policy
might reduce this tendency.
Government interviewees believe we should increase
the progress payment rate from the current 80 percent to the
old rate for shipbuilding and repair of 90 percent. All
personnel interviewed agreed this increase will have a
profound impact on the financial health of contractors,
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especially the smaller contractors with high value
contracts.
There is a question whether or not the SUPSHIPs are
adequately staffed with quality personnel. While the
SUPSHIPs expressed confidence in the quality of their
people, several contractors expressed a different opinion.
Most contractor interviewees thought the SUPSHIPs do not
employ quality personnel to accurately estimate and plan the
repair work, provide timely responses to IDRs and promptly
adjudicate changes and REAs.
F. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF VARIOUS CONTRACTING
METHODS AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
In the previous section, the literature and responses
from interviewees suggested various methods for ship repair
and overhaul contracting. This section addresses some of
the obstacles to the implementation of those methods and
management practices. Government interviewees cited the
complexity of the ship repair and overhaul process along
with Navy policy and funding constraints as the major
obstacles to implementation of these suggested contracting
methods and management practices.
The Government's legislatively preferred contracting
methodology is to use sealed bidding resulting in a firm
fixed-price contract [Ref. 16:p. 9], Additionally, the
Secretary of the Navy has directed that the procurement of
all ship repair and overhaul services be contracted for on a
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fixed-price basis. Interviewees indicated that the
obstacles to the utilization of other than fixed-price
contracts in ship repair and overhaul acquisition are:
1. The availability of an extremely competitive market
with excess capacity.
2. A fixed-price contract will provide the lowest initial
cost and risk to the Government.
3
.
The fixed-price for the repair service provides
flexibility in budget execution for the funding
activities.
4. Anything other than the sealed bid process violates
the concept of full and open competition, and may
result in a protest of the award by other offerors.
5. The contractor is willing to accept a fixed-price
contract.
6. The source selection process is less complicated and
under routine circumstances a fixed-price contract
requires less resources to administer.
7. Cost type contracts do not provide a strong incentive
to control cost.
8. Cost type contracts may encourage the diversion of
skilled labor to fixed-price contracts.
9. Despite the technical complexity and business risk
involved, cost type contracts are perceived as
sweetheart deals.
The means for prevention or rejection of an unrealistic
bid in a fixed-price procurement are extremely limited [Rep.
11 :p. 5.5.1-9]. The Contracting Officer can initiate
communications with the contractor to ensure the unrealistic
bid isn't the result of an error or misunderstanding. If
the contractor can meet the requirements of the IFB, is
financially responsible and technically qualified, the Navy
has no choice other than to award the contract to the
79
unrealistic bidder [Ref. ll:p. 5.5.1-1]. The prevailing
legal view is that fixed-price bids may not be refused
because they knowingly understate the anticipated cost of
performance. This is supported by the following decision of
the Comptroller General: "Although below cost bids are to
be discouraged, they are not prohibited by procurement
regulations and so this office will not object to contract
awards on this basis" [Ref. 40].
The complexity of the ship repair process is the primary
obstacle to minimizing contract cost growth, and the
prevention of the opportunity of a contractor in a loss
posture to recover cost. A large part of the work to be
done is not definitized until after contract award. Growth
and new work requirements are difficult to estimate and work
packages must be prepared months in advance of the start of
work [Ref. 16:p. 12].
Interviewees indicated that funding constraints and
compensation under the Civilian Personnel Pay and Promotion
System are the primary obstacles to attaining the personnel
and resources necessary to staff SUPSHIPs to a level that
can respond rapidly to the requirements of the repair
effort. Contractor interviewees believed the Civilian
Personnel System of pay and promotion attracted personnel of
lower quality or experience. Interviewees thought the
complexity of the repair process would require enormous
resources to develop adequate work specification work
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packages and to effectively manage GFM. Additionally, the
deficit posture of the United States Government and the
prohibitive cost of subsidies will not permit the
Administration or Congress to subsidize commercial
shipbuilding and repair to adequately sustain the current
industrial base [Ref. 3:p. 1]
.
G. SUMMARY
The data presented in this chapter clearly show that
there are no easy solutions for the avoidance of claims in
ship repair and overhaul. Although extensive literature
research and many experienced Government and industry
personnel were interviewed, no single all encompassing
solution was developed which did not conflict with other
goals, policies or realities. The only consensus reached
was that an improvement to the economic status of the
industry, and a reduction in contract cost growth must be
attained to improve the adverse business relationship and
avoid future contractor claims. NAVSEA has implemented
initiatives which, under more favorable industry conditions
might produce good results. The next chapter provides the
conclusions and recommendations of this research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The two primary reasons for contractor claims in the
ship repair and overhaul industry are:
1. The inability of the Navy to control contract cost
growth resulting from changes to the contract.
2. The dismal economic status of the shipbuilding and
repair industry.
The fierce competition among the contractors in the
industry is amplified by their need to obtain Navy contracts
to survive as business entities. The consensus of the
Government interviewees is that this dilemma has increased
the number of unrealistic bids (buy-ins) submitted by
contractors in response to IFBs. The Navy's procurement
policy for repair and overhaul services has intensified this
situation. This policy directs the acquisition of all
repair and overhaul services to be contracted for on a
fixed-price basis. Because the Navy is the dominant
customer in the industry (Navy contracts accounted for 90%
of all industry repair and overhaul work in 1986)
,
contractors have little leverage in altering this policy.
The contractors' willingness to submit unrealistic bids
may hinge on the fact that the Navy will almost always make
changes to the contract. These changes are negotiated in a
sole-source environment. This provides the contractor with
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an advantage in change negotiations and the opportunity to
recover costs and convert a loss posture to one of profit.
The complexity of the overhaul process and the inability of
the Navy to provide definitized specification work packages
are the primary contributions to contract cost growth.
Other factors which contribute to cost growth are: late and
defective GFM; contract acceleration; delays in responses to
IDRs; and the failure to negotiate or adjudicate changes,
REAs, and disputes in a timely manner. The above factors
coupled with the Navy's control of the contracting process
have created an adverse business relationship between the
Navy and its contractors. In this environment, several
contractors view the claims process as routine within the
business and a preferred method of settling disputes.
The primary motivation for claims avoidance is the
extensive resources required, by both the Government and the
contractor, for preparation and litigation of claims and
disputes. Business and professional reputations are
tarnished and one of the most significant, but
unquantifiable, costs is the possible delay in the return of
a ship and her crew to the active fleet.
B. CONCLUSIONS
As stated in the previous chapter there is no one set of
contracting methods and management techniques which can be
employed to reduce or avoid contractor claims in ship repair
and overhaul. The majority of the personnel interviewed
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expressed the same or similar opinion as the former NAVSEA
Deputy Commander for Contracts, RADM L. Hopkins. In his
opening remarks before a Claims Lessons Learned Seminar
conducted by the Navy Logistics Management School, he stated
[Ref. 23:p. 2]:
.... We cannot prevent a claim from being filed. The
Navy is not perfect regarding its actions with a
contractor and there will always be some basis for a claim
whether it is filed or not. However, keep this in mind
for it is important, it is likely that a contractor who is
making a profit will not submit a claim .
The researcher agrees with the Admiral that it would be
highly unusual for a contractor reaping a reasonable profit
to file a claim. However, the Navy is not in the repair and
overhaul business to guarantee its contractors a profit.
The Navy's overhaul and repair organizations have been
tasked by the Secretary of the Navy with the responsibility
of obtaining these services at a fair and reasonable price
to the Government.
The researcher also agrees with the Admiral on the point
that we cannot prevent the tendency of contractors to file
claims. While we cannot prevent all claims, several
contracting methods and management techniques can be
employed to prevent claims in the ship repair and overhaul
industry.
The conclusions of this research on ship repair and
overhaul claims and claims avoidance techniques are:
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Conclusion 1. An intensive ship repair and overhaul
claims avoidance effort exists. however. it lacks a
coordinated policy .
There is no central policy which outlines the use of
contracting methods and other management techniques to avoid
ship repair and overhaul claims. The management and funding
of the repair process is fragmented and requires
considerable effort and skill to coordinate. The approach
to claims avoidance and the make-up of the claims avoidance
team at each local SUPSHIP is a function of the
personalities involved. The more common aspects of claims
avoidance efforts such as the maintenance of significant
events files and the prompt pricing and negotiations of
contract changes, were consistent or similar. However,
several low profile but significant procedures differed.
For example, personnel training and qualifications were not
consistent. Also the utilization of surveyors to negotiate
low dollar value changes to contracts was not employed
consistently in field activities.
Conclusion 2. Ship repair and overhaul contractors
generally believe that claims development and submission are
a routine part of doing business with the Navy .
Most contractors stated the contracting policies of the
Navy made the development and submission of claims a routine
business practice. Contractors stated the following
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contracting procedures and management practices created this
environment:
a. the exclusive use of fixed-price contracts, despite
the complexity of the repair effort
b. the issuance of unilateral contract changes
c. the requirement to maintain the original repair
schedule while absorbing several changes to the
contract
d. the requirement to preprice unknown growth work prior
to contract award
e. the refusal of the Navy to recognize the contractor's
entitlement to cumulative delay and disruption that
result from numerous changes to the contract.
Conclusion 3, Contractors believe that buv-ins are
necessary in order to remain competitive in the ship repair
business .
Contractors interviewees stated that obtaining contracts
in the currently competitive ship repair and overhaul
environment made it necessary to entertain contract buy-ins
or the submission of bids with zero profit margin as a
business strategy. Both Government and contractor
interviewees believed a reduction in the industrial base
will occur over the next five years. This decline will
result from the lack of commercial contracts, a decline in
the Navy's shipbuilding program and the change in the Navy's
maintenance policy. This maintenance policy will reduce the
number of ship overhauls by increasing the number of ships
in the Phase Maintenance Program.
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Contractors stated that those who obtain contracts, even
below the cost to perform, will continue to exist as
business entities, whereas those who do not will be forced
to close or enter a different industry. The basic policy of
most contractors was to bid as low as necessary to obtain
contracts and look to improve their loss or profit posture
through changes to the contract.
Conclusion 4. Ship repair and overhaul contractors
believe that the Naw is unwilling to adjust the ship repair
and overhaul schedules when demanded by substantial growth
work .
Both contractor and Government interviewees stated that
returning the ship to the fleet on the scheduled repair
completion date was a significant concern. The Type
Commanders have direct control over repair funds and
indirect control of the repair process. In addition to
repair concerns, the Type Commanders have rigid operational
schedules to fulfill. These requirements have long made the
Navy reluctant to extend schedules, often to the detriment
of overhaul quality and the incurrence of contract cost
overruns. Contractors contend that any acceleration of the
contract reduces efficiency and disrupts the repair efforts.
Contractors also contend that negotiations of efficiency
loss and disruption with the Navy is very difficult.
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Conclusion 5. There were no significant contractor
efforts to avoid claims evident in the literature or
interviews .
Contracting Officers stated they often have a difficult
time obtaining a waiver or release of the contractors' right
to claims or the signing of a modification. Contractors
contend that it is almost impossible to anticipate all of
the cost impact of a change at the time the change occurs
[Ref. 10:pp. 6,26]. Additionally, contractors contend that
the claims process is a method of ensuring that cost
entitlement is obtained.
Government interviews stated the above position is taken
by all contractors, even those not in a loss or low profit
posture. Also, any contractor in a loss posture actively
seeks opportunities to recover cost through changes to the
contract or the development and submission of claims. [Ref.
10:p. 6]
Conclusion 6. Ship repair and overhaul contractors
believe the Government is conducting unfair business
practices with the inclusion of the Additional Government
Requirements (AGR) Clauses in the contract . Contractors
stated that the Government is engaging in unfair business
practices by requiring them to preprice growth work before
the effort begins. At this time neither the contractor nor
the Navy can determine where and what type of growth work
will be encountered. Third party access is even more
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controversial. Contractors contend that under this
initiative the Government alone determines what prices are
fair and reasonable. If a contractor refuses to accept the
Government's definition of fair and reasonable. the
Government has the option of obtaining another contractor to
perform the task on the first contractor's work site. This
third party, with access to its work site, could be a major
competitor. This would provide a competitor with the
opportunity to view propriety work procedures or have access
to trade secrets which would enhance its competitive
position for future contracts.
Conclusion 7. The shifting of ship overhauls from
regional to coastwide competition did not improve the
competitive position of those contractors located outside of
manor homeports .
This policy change has not significantly affected the
distribution of maintenance actions because the Navy has
been increasing the number of selected restricted
availabilities and decreasing the number of overhauls.
Since selected restricted availabilities normally are
planned to take less than six months, private shipyards in
the homeport areas will continue to receive most of this
work. Additionally, other repair work to fill in the slack




Recommendation 1. The Navy should utilize both fixed-
price and cost-reimbursement type contracts in the
acquisition of ship repair and overhaul services . A
significant aspect of claims prevention is the utilization
of the appropriate contract type. The exclusive use of
fixed-price contracts requires the availability of
reasonably definite design or performance specifications and
that a fair and reasonable price can be established
initially [Ref. 5:para. 3-406.1]. The primary determinants
of contract type are technical uncertainty and cost
uncertainty. While the fixed-price contract usually
provides the lowest initial cost and risk to the Government,
there are clearly situations where the risks of performance
and cost are sufficient enough to justify the Government
accepting a larger share of contract risk. Although there
is a great deal of uncertainty in all Navy repair efforts,
due to the nature of the work itself, cost-plus-award-fee
contracts should be reserved for complex repair work. The
use of a fixed-price contract in highly complex repair
efforts may result in attaining a lower quality overhaul at
a higher cost upon completion of change negotiation and
claim settlements.
Recommendation 2 . Implement a source selection process
which rejects unrealistic contractor bids . This policy
would be consistent with DOD policy that requires the
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payment of fair and reasonable prices for supplies and
services [Ref. 5:3-801]. Successful implementation of this
policy will require the establishment of source selection
evaluation criteria for rejection of unrealistically low
bids. For example, bids that are a certain percent below
the Government estimate or the average of all the contract
bids would require communications with that contractor to
ensure a mistake was not made. If no mistake was made, the
contractor would be required to submit a detailed breakdown
of the estimate for review for cost realism by a source
selection evaluation group within NAVSEA headquarters. This
policy would tend to reduce protests by unsuccessful
offerors alleging buy-ins. The specifics of the source
selection evaluation criteria would be promulgated in the
solicitation for bids.
Recommendation 3 . NAVSEA should revise the Additional
Government Requirement (AGR) Clause to recognize anticipated
growth work by various categories, growth work from
defective Government Furnished Information (GFI) and
subcontractor costs . Currently, growth work under the
clause is prepriced in total up to 20 percent of the base
overhaul hours. The clause should be revised to reflect
anticipated growth work requirements in hull, mechanical,
electrical, electronics, and other similar categories. For
example: the make-up of the growth work hours could be hull
—10%, mechanical—45%, electrical—20%, electronics— 15%,
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misc.— 10%. The allocated percentages could be developed by
ship type and provided in the IFB. All contractors cited
the difficulty encountered in prepricing an unknown entity.
This procedure would assist the contractor in his efforts
and demonstrate the Navy's willingness to ensure fair and
reasonable bids are submitted.
Delete growth work that results from defective GFI and
price it at the forward pricing rate. The contractor should
not be required to preprice growth work for an item that is
exclusively the responsibility of the Government.
NAVSEA should not delete subcontract costs from the AGR
rate. Several Government and contractor personnel suggested
the removal of this requirement from the clause. Removal of
this requirement will allow the contractor to game the
process by subcontracting out all or selected growth work,
thereby nullifying the effects of the clause. This would be
particularly so if there are no limitations on
subcontracting in the contract.
Recommendation 4 . NAVSEA should continue efforts to
control and reduce contract cost growth . Contract cost
growth is a primary cause of contractor claims due to delay
and disruption. It also provides contractors in a loss
posture, due to a buy-in or poor management, the opportunity
to recover costs. Additional resources should be utilized
to ensure that GFM, both information and equipment, is
identified, verified, and delivered in a timely manner.
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Changes should be approved and priced expeditiously to
prevent delays in the repair process. SUPSHIPs should
discuss anticipated problems and changes with NAVSEA and the
TYCOMs in advance, and obtain authorization to act promptly
when action is required.
Recommendation 5. The Congress. POD and the Navy should
promulgate a comprehensive policy for shipbuilding and
repair mobilization base maintenance . The present
industrial base has sufficient capacity to support
mobilization, but is far in excess of the current demand.
At present, several marginal contractors are hopeful that
Congress will pass legislation to subsidize the industry and
preserve the industrial base, or require the Navy to conduct
more repairs and overhauls in private shipyards. A policy
statement would allow these marginal contractors to either
plan for a transition to a new industry, close their
operation or modernize their facilities if the current
industrial base will be maintained. This recommendation
might ease the adversity and cut-throat competition in the
industry.
Recommendation 6. NAVSEA should ensure that the
SUPSHIPs are adeguatelv staffed with well trained personnel .
Qualified personnel are required to accurately plan and
estimate the repair work; provide timely responses to
Inspection Deficiency Reports and Contract Problem Reports;
promptly authorize and negotiate changes; and adjudicate
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REAs, claims, and disputes. SUPSHIPs personnel must possess
the knowledge and authority to carry out their contact
administration responsibilities.
Recommendation 7. NAVSEA should promulgate a standard
policy for the composition and skill levels of the claims
avoidance field organizations . Most SUPSHIPs claims
avoidance divisions or teams are understaffed. A variety of
personnel of different grade levels make up the group. As a
minimum, the group should be headed by a GS-12 or GS-13.
Each group, at the very least, should include a contracts
specialist, industrial specialist and price analyst. The
group may be augmented as required to support increased
workloads.
Recommendation 8. NAVSEA and SUPSHIPs should take a
proactive attitude to improve the business relationship with
its contractors . A variety of measures can be taken to
attain this end. The Government should seriously attempt to
deal fairly and equitably with its contractors. The
contract type employed should reflect the nature of the
repair or overhaul services required. The role of the
Contracting Officer in issuing unilateral changes to the
contract should not be abused. Contractor cooperation
should be obtained and encouraged in restructuring
requirements
.
The Post Award Orientation Conference should be utilized
to establish contract requirements, clarify initial
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questions and concerns, and open well-defined and effective
lines of communications. A spirit of cooperation should be
established and maintained throughout the contract
performance period. The Significant Events Meetings should
be utilized to reinforce this process and identify ongoing
or scheduled events which are potential claim areas.
Recommendation 9. The Navy should evaluate the total
impact of reducing the progress payment rate from 90 percent
to 80 percent . This study should focus on the financial
status of contractors, ship delivery schedules and claims
potential to the Navy. For example, the impact on a medium
sized, highly leveraged contractor with $40 million in Navy
contracts can be critical. The contractor must in effect
finance approximately $8 million of the repair effort. If
he has utilized debt to modernize his facilities and his
profit margin is low, he will have difficulties obtaining
the financing necessary to perform. This may negatively
impact the quality of the work and the repair schedule.
Recommendation 10. The Navy should study the concept of
enhancing ship repair and overhaul management and technical
expertise at the SUPSHIPs location . The SUPSHIPs possess
limited authority and technical expertise in controlling key
management functions which are essential for consistently
ensuring effective ship repairs and overhauls. Although the
local SUPSHIPs are the closest to the repair effort and
liaison daily with the contractors, NAVSEA and the TYCOMs
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control the funds and the repair effort. For most changes
required to the contract, the SUPSHIP must obtain approval
from NAVSEA or the TYCOM. Highly technical changes may
require extensive communication of requirements to higher
authority, and a lengthy technical evaluation by experts at
the NAVSEA level. Long approval cycles affect the
contractor's efforts and are major contributors to delay and
disruption claims. Placement of technical expertise and
authority at the SUPSHIP level may speed up the approval
process and improve the quality and cost efficiency of ship
repair and overhauls.
Recommendation 11. The Navy should establish standard
guidelines and policies with respect to cumulative delay and
disruption . While contract law, and Contracting Officers'
decisions continue to deny entitlement for the effect of
cumulative delay and disruption in contractor claims, the
impact of delay and disruption continues to be considered in
the negotiated settlement of claims. The Navy should
establish a policy of rejection or recognition of cumulative
delay and disruption. If recognized, guidelines should be
developed for evaluating the impact and establishing
entitlement.
Recommendation 12. The period for submitting a claim
against the Government should be made definite . The lack of
a time limit on the submission of fully documented claims
provides the contractor with the opportunity to determine
96
the level of profitability of a particular contract and then
file a very complicated omnibus claim. The time lapse
places the Government at an additional disadvantage due to
the transfer of personnel and the higher number of repair
efforts assigned to Government personnel. As an example, a
two year statue of limitations would provide ample time for
contractors to submit fully documented claims. The Navy and
DOD should submit legislation to Congress to effect such a
requirement.
Recommendation 13. NAVSEA should require SUPSHIP's
compliance with the requirement to submit lessons learned
from claims which have been resolved . NAVSEAINST 4365.1c
requires the claim team manager to forward to NAVSEA (Code
028) , a memorandum report discussing the lessons learned
from claims analyses and suggested actions to avoid the
recurrence of similar claims. This report is to be
forwarded 90 days after the claim is settled. NAVSEA should
issue quarterly claims lessons learned bulletins to its
fields activities.
D. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Answers will be provided to the subsidiary questions
first culminating with the primary research question.
1. Subsidiary Questions
What are the current bases of ship repair and
overhaul claims ? The primary bases for claims are: 1)
changes to the contract, 2) late and defective GFM, 3)
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economic and contractual causes, and 4) complex causes and
effects. Delay and disruption are the largest claim
elements in dollar value, averaging over 50 percent of the
total dollars claimed.
What are the current principal contracting areas in
ship repair and overhaul that contribute to contractor
claims? The exclusive use of fixed-price contracts in the
acquisition of ship repair and overhaul services is the
major contributor to contractor claims. The source
selection criteria under the competitive bidding process
allows the contractor to submit unrealistic bids. The
intense competition within the depressed industry often
forces contractors to buy-in just to obtain contracts. Once
awarded the contract, the contractor utilizes every
opportunity to correct his loss or improve his profit
posture through the sole-source negotiation of changes to
the contract. The use of fixed-price contracts for highly
complex overhauls coupled with the contractors' willingness
to buy-in and attempt to improve his loss posture through
sole-source negotiations significantly contribute to
contractor claims and the existence of an adverse business
relationship.
How have the recent Congressional and POD
initiatives to reduce cost through full and open competition
affected ship repair and overhaul claims? The passage of
the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) promoted more
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competition in an already competitive environment. It
allowed unsuccessful offerors to submit unsubstantiated bid
protests. A bid protest under the provisions of CICA
requires the delay of contract award or the start of work
until the protest is resolved. Additionally, in an
environment of full and open competition, some Contracting
Officers felt compelled to consider bids from offerors who
did not hold a MSR contract or an agreement for boat repair
for simple ship repair services.
What effect have socio-economic initiatives had on
the ability of the contracting officer to eliminate
irresponsible bid proposals from section 8 (a) small
business contractors ? Contracting officers indicated that
the cooperation they received from the Small Business
Representatives was excellent. Only one case was cited in
which a small business failed to perform. The small
businesses operate with a lower overhead and in most cases
their price proposals are realistic.
What are the critical economic factors in the ship
repair and overhaul industry and what effect have they had
on the industry's ability to perform? The critical economic
factor in the ship repair and overhaul industry is that the
supply of repair and overhaul services significantly exceeds
the demand. Additionally the industry is dominated by one
customer, the U.S. Navy, who is in a position to dictate
contracting terms and demand competitive pricing of
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services. The Navy's demand for efficient performance and
competitive prices require the contractors to streamline
operations and invest in modern efficient equipment with no
guarantee of Navy contracts to finance this investment. The
fierce competition within the industry has prompted the
submission of unrealistic bids to obtain contracts. This
tactic usually results in either cost-cutting methods which
diminish quality, obstinate negotiations of changes to the
contract, or the submission of a claim to correct the
initial loss posture. Both the literature and interviewees
predict a dismal future for the industry. The general
consensus among all interviewees was that at least 30
percent of the industrial base will not survive the next
five years.
What are the effects of the current "NAVSEA anti-
buv-in" initiatives? The private sector ship repair cost
control initiatives (anti-buy-in measures) have aggravated
the adverse business relationship. Several contractors have
underbid both the base contract and the growth work, thereby
intensifying their loss posture.
Can ship repair and overhaul acquisition be modeled
to reduce or avoid claims and disputes ? The research
indicates that there is no one set of contracting methods
and management techniques which can be employed to reduce or
avoid claims. The complexity of the ship repair and
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overhaul process requires that each situation be approached
individually.
2 . Primary Research Question
What are the contracting and management techniques
and procedures that can be employed to reduce and avoid
contractor claims in the ship repair and overhaul industry
and how might such claims be avoided in the future? The
application of sound business judgement and appropriate
contracting methods during the repair effort can prevent
most claims and disputes.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Several areas of ship repair and overhaul claims and
claims avoidance techniques were uncovered during the
research which were beyond the scope of this paper but
deserve additional investigation. Areas recommended as
follow-on thesis or research topics are:
1. Develop source selection methods to prevent contractor
buy-ins under the master ship repair contract.
2. Analyze the impact of the Private Sector Ship Repair
Cost Control initiatives.
3. Determine the ideal organization for the acquisition
of ship repair and overhaul services, including
staffing, managerial and technical requirements.
4
.
Determine the industrial base required to support the
Navy ' s future ship repair and overhaul service requirements.
101
APPENDIX A
MILESTONES FOR PLANNING PRIVATE SHIPYARD
OVERHAULS AND SELECTED RESTRICTED AVAILABILITIES
A. MILESTONES FOR PLANNING PRIVATE SHIPYARD REGULAR
OVERHAULS
A-500 PERA provide repair planning letter and material
ordering guide to the SUPSHIP planning activity.
SUPSHIP begin overhaul planning.
A-500 PERA complete Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection
(POT&I) plan and promulgate tasking for POT&I
execution.
A-485 SUPSHIP identify, from this POT&I plan, components
and/or systems for SUPSHIP internal POT&I
execution. (SUPSHIP activities shall focus POT&I
efforts on these components or systems that are
known problem areas)
.
A-480 SUPSHIPs receive baseline SARP with "D" and "K"
Alterations.
A-479 SUPSHIPs receive PERA identified Long Leadtime
Repair Material (LLTM)
.
A-475 SUPSHIP begin contract specification preparation
for repairs and alterations and provide copies (as
completed) to TYCOM, PERA, overhaul SUPSHIP and
ship for review.
A-450 NAVSEA/PERA provide advance planning letter with
initial funding for SHIPALTs based on the Fleet
Modernization Program (FMP)
.
A-450 TYCOM/PERA provide advance planning letter with
initial advance planning funds, milestones and D-
Alterations and repairs.
A-450 SUPSHIP commence identifying/ordering long-leadtime
material to support MAVSEA/TYCOM alterations and
repairs.
A-390 NAVSEA/TYCOM provide long-leadtime material funds
to SUPSHIPs.
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A-37 5 SUPSHIP received completed BACDs from planning
yard.
A-3 60 SUPSHIP begin consolidated Ship Allowance List
(COSAL) update.
A-360 SUPSHIP complete shipchecks, prior to ships




A-280 PERA provide completed POT&I report to
SUPSHIP/TYCOM.
A-270 SUPSHIP complete Supplemental Alteration Drawings
(SAD)
.
A-260 PERA provide proposed SARP for SUPSHIP cost
estimating.
A-240 NAVSEA provide ship alteration authorization
letter.
A-230 SUPSHIP issue cost proposed SARP to TYCOM/PERA for
review prior to Work Definition Conference (WDC)
.
A-230 SUPSHIP provide preliminary SHIPALT cost estimates
to NAVSEA.
A-200 Work Definition Conference (WDC)
.
A-200 TYCOM provide screened supplementary repair work
request. (After A-180 only emergent/mandatory work
requests shall be submitted by TYCOM.
A-200 NAVSEA cancel SHIPALTs for which special program
material, essential installation material and or
design agent documents, by formal letter or
message, that the required material or plans will
not be available before the start of the ship's
availability or, in the case of overhauls scheduled
to take more than 9 months to complete, that
material will be available at least 30 days prior
to actual need. Prior to cancellation of a SHIPALT
for lack of material or plans, NAVSEA will advise
OPNAV OP-43) of its intended action.
A-185 PERA provide authorized SARP to SUPSHIPs.
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A-170 SUPSHIP completed bid specifications to support
baseline SARP and additional work items resulting
from W.D.C.
A-170 SUPSHIPs provide final SHIPALT cost estimate to
NAVSEA.
A-165 Planning SUPSHIP turnover specifications to
overhaul SUPSHIP and confer.
A-165 SUPSHIPs request NAVSEA/TYCOM to provide funds
required to support total estimate of overhaul
package
.
A-150 SUPSHIP issue Solicitation for Bids (IFB)
.
A-150 Contractor's evaluation of scope of contract
specifications for bidding purposes.
A-90 Cut-off date for amendments to IFB.
A-74 Bid opening.
A-72 SUPSHIP conduct pre-award survey.
A-64 SUPSHIPs forward readiness report to begin and
complete overhaul to NAVSEA/TYCOM. IAW (NAVSEA 074
Ltr Ser 565 of 4 Jan 78)
.
A-60 Award Contract.
A-60 SUPSHIPs advise NAVSEA of dollar amount of contract
award to SHIPALT.
A Begin overhaul.
A thru SUPSHIPs continually update SARP for submission to
comp. PERA/TYCOM following completion of ship overhaul.
C+30 SUPSHIP provide input to PERA for post overhaul
analysis report.
C+60 SUPSHIP provide departure report in accordance with
NAVSEAINST 4790.14 and marked-up 4720/3.
C+75 PERA issue updated SARP resulting from availability
completion.
C+90 Complete and deliver all Selected Record Drawings
and Date.
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C+90 PERA issue Post Overhaul Analysis Report (POAR)
.









Scope of Work Submit Screened






E. Less Than 400 A-30
B. MILESTONES
OVERHAULS
FOR PLANNING PRIVATE SHIPYARD SELECTED
A-540 PERA provide repair planning letter and material
ordering guide to the SUPSHIP planning activity.
SUPSHIP begin overhaul planning.
A-540 PERA complete Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection
(POT&I) plan and promulgate tasking for POT&I
execution.
A-525 SUPSHIP identify, from this POT&I plan, components
and/or systems for SUPSHIP internal POT&I
execution. (SUPSHIP activities shall focus POT&I
efforts on these components or systems that are
known problem areas)
.
A-500 SUPSHIPs receive baseline SARP with "D" and "K"
Alterations.
A-495 SUPSHIPs receive PERA identified Long Leadtime
Repair Material (LLTM)
.
A-495 SUPSHIP begin contract specification preparation
for repairs and alterations and provide copies (as
completed) to TYCOM, PERA, overhaul SUPSHIP and
ship for review.
A-470 NAVSEA/PERA provide advance planning letter with




A-470 TYCOM/PERA provide advance planning letter with
initial advance planning funds, milestones and D-
Alterations and repairs.
A-470 SUPSHIP commence identifying/ordering long-leadtime
material to support MAVSEA/TYCOM alterations and
repairs.
A-425 NAVSEA/TYCOM provide long-leadtime material funds
to SUPSHIPs.
A-385 SUPSHIP received completed BACDs from planning
yard.
A-360 SUPSHIP begin consolidated Ship Allowance List
(COSAL) update.
A-375 SUPSHIP complete shipchecks, prior to ships




A-320 PERA provide completed POT&I report to
SUPSHIP/TYCOM.
A-290 SUPSHIP complete Supplemental Alteration Drawings
(SAD)
.
A-305 PERA provide proposed SARP for SUPSHIP cost
estimating.
A-270 NAVSEA provide ship alteration authorization
letter.
A-270 SUPSHIP issue cost proposed SARP to TYCOM/PERA for
review prior to Work Definition Conference (WDC)
.
A-250 SUPSHIP provide preliminary SHIPALT cost estimates
to NAVSEA.
A-240 Work Definition Conference (WDC)
.
A-230 TYCOM provide screened supplementary repair work
request. (After A-180 only emergent/mandatory work
requests shall be submitted by TYCOM.
A-220 NAVSEA cancel SHIPALTs for which special program
material, essential installation material and or
design agent documents, by formal letter or
message, that the required material or plans will
be available be the start of the ship's
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availability or, in the case of overhauls scheduled
to take more than 9 months to complete, that
material will be available at least 30 days prior
to actual need. Prior to cancellation of a SHIPALT
for lack of material or plans, NAVSEA will advise
OPNAV OP-43) of its intended action.
A-220 PERA provide authorized SARP to SUPSHIPs.
A-200 SUPSHIP completed bid specifications to support
baseline SARP and additional work items resulting
from W.D.C.
A-200 SUPSHIPs provide final SHIPALT cost estimate to
NAVSEA.
A-195 Planning SUPSHIP turnover specifications to
overhaul SUPSHIP.
A-195 SUPSHIPs request NAVSEA/TYCOM to provide funds
required to support total estimate of overhaul
package.
A-180 SUPSHIP issue Solicitation for Bids (IFB)
.
A-180 Contractor evaluation of scope of work prescribed
in contract bid specifications.
A-120 Cut-off date for amendments to IFB.
A-104 Bid opening.
A-102 SUPSHIP conduct pre-award survey.
A-94 SUPSHIPs forward readiness report to begin and
complete overhaul to NAVSEA/TYCOM. IAW (NAVSEA 074
Ltr Ser 565 of 4 Jan 78).
A-90 Award Contract.
A-90 SUPSHIPs advise NAVSEA of dollar amount of contract
award to support ship alterations.
A Begin overhaul.
A thru SUPSHIPs continually update SARP for submission to
comp. PERA/TYCOM following completion of ship overhaul.
C+30 SUPSHIP provide input to PERA for post overhaul
analysis report.
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C+60 SUPSHIP provide departure report in accordance with
NAVSEAINST 4790.14 and corrected 4720/3.
C+75 PERA issue availability completion SARP.
C+90 Complete and deliver all Selected Record Drawings
and Date.
C+90 PERA issue Post Overhaul Analysis Report (POAR)
.
C. PLANNING MILESTONES FOR SELECTED RESTRICTED
AVAILABILITIES (SRA) (DDEOC)
A-360 Identify ship alteration packages.
A-355 Issue ship alteration planning letter and advance
planning funds.
A-330 Verify Ship alteration and BACD applicability.
A-3 00 Identify availability of material for ship
alterations.
A-275 Conduct repair ship check.
A-270 Finalize ship alteration package.
A-260 Produce baseline SARP and material list.
A-270 Forward baseline SARP and material list to planning
activity.
A-190 Complete supplemental Alteration drawings.
A-180 Produce preliminary SARP.
A-165 Forward preliminary SARP to the planning activity
for cost estimates.
A- 130 Conduct overhaul assessment.
A-12 Produce and distribute proposed SARP.
A-80 Complete bid specification preparation.
A-60 Planned work cut-off.
A-60 Review bid specifications.
A-55 Work definition conference (W.D.C.)
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A-50 Issue solicitations for bids (IFB)
.
A-50 Contractor shipcheck.
A-50 PERA issue authorized SARP.
A-35 Bid opening.




A+7 Industrial work complete/accomplish seatrials.
A+60 Issue departure report.
A+65 Issue availability.
Source: NAVSEA Ship Repair Manual
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
AGR Additional Government Requirement
ASBCA Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
ASN(S&L) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding
& Logistics)
CFM Contractor Furnished Materials
CNO Chief Naval Operations
COFD Contracting Officers Final Decision
COMNAVSEASYSCOM Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
CPAF Cost Plus Award Fee
CPR Contract Problem Reports
DAR Defense Acquisition Regulations
DOD Department of Defense
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations
FFP Firm Fixed-Price
FPAF Fixed-Price Award Fee
FPIF Fixed-Price Incentive Fee
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